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SYNOPSIS.
This thesis sets out to examine the ’Irish Miracle' - the 
recent favourable economic performance exhibited by the Irish 
Republic,, and more particularly the growth of the industrial sector, 
which has shown rapid and continuous development throughout the 1960's 
and '70’s, which has been mainly export-led growth, and chiefly 
through foreign investment. It attempts to put this so-called 
'miracle' into perspective, comparing the overall national economic 
trends with those of other 'western' economies, and, more importantly, 
looking at the extent of progress which has been made towards regional 
convergence within Ireland itself.
The first chapter outlines the general economic and industrial 
change which has taken place since ' Independence', and thus sets out 
the background against which more recent performance may be assessed. 
Particular attention is given to the reasons for, and the type of 
change which took place in the late 1950's, with the move from 
protection to industrial development under free trade. It further 
describes the country's short demographic history, which shows some 
links with economic performance, and which has been used as a barometer 
of national economic health.
Chapter two looks at the needs for both overall national economic 
growth, and for regional development to alleviate, in particular, the 
East-West differential in terms of economic and social wellbeing.
Firstly, national performance is compared with that of other countries, 
chiefly in the E.E.C., showing the development gap which still has to 
be bridged, and thus outlining the case for national rather than a 
regional policy options to be pursued. The regional imbalance is also 
outlined, giving some idea of the regional planning problems to be faced. 
The discussion then focuses on the various development strategies which 
have been suggested, ranging from Buchanons growth centre strategy to 
the dispersed development advocated by the Government and by the 
Industrial Development Authority in the early 1970's. Those themes 
are further developed in chapter three which looks at the development 
of planning in Ireland at both the national and sub-national level. 
Emphasis in particular is given to the adequacies of regional planning 
to date, and to possible alternative mechanisms of enacting regional 
policies, which could loosen the administrative straight jacket imposed
by central authorities.
The fourth, and main chapter, focuses attention on the 
Industrial Development Authority, which has a national responsibility 
to foster industrial development, and which has been largely 
responsible for the large volume of foreign investment which has been 
attracted to Ireland in recent years. The work of the Authority has 
influence beyong that of simply attracting industrial growth, and this 
has been recognised in its remit to foster national regional policy 
objectives. This, together with looking at the absolute volume of 
employment growth generated, and the main instruments behind this, 
overall performance will be looked at in terms of its compliance with 
regional development aims.
The main theme of the penultimate chapter is that of Ireland 
in the E.E.C. and in particular the benefits from Membership, as they 
relate to both industrial and regional development. More important 
is the future for Ireland within the E.E.C. which is highly dependent 
on the discretionary application of rules and regulations by the 
European Commission. Discussion in particular will centre on the 
Community's Competition Policy, mainly as it relates to State Aids to 
Industry, the continuation of which is vital to Ireland's future 
industrial prosperity. Consideration will be given to how the 
country has been affected by these Policy regulations to date, and 
possible implications for the future.
The concluding chapter looks at progress to date, and considers 
the possible repercussions of recent economic and demographic trends, 
and gives some tentative suggestions as to what the future might hold 
for Ireland. It will also consider any possible lessons which might 
be learned from recent experience in Ireland, relating both to 
industrial growth and to regional development.
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Introduction
The decade of the seventies has been marked by a general 
economic and industrial recession from which few developed economies 
escaped, and from which many have yet to fully recover. The general 
characteristics can be summarised as rapidly rising rates of unem­
ployment, a decrease in the volume of productive investment and 
worsening balance of paymentsproblems. This latter factor can 
chiefly be attributed to substantial oil price rises, increasing the 
share of fuel in the import bill of most, if not all, Western 
nations, but even in the U.K. where expanding home production of oil 
provided some protection from these increases the overall picture 
has been one of almost total economic stagnation.
Throughout the above period, as in the decade before, many 
industrial sectors contracted severely in employment terms and under­
went considerable structural change. The cushion of new foreign 
owned industry used in the sixties to soften the blow of resulting 
structural! unemployment has, however, become a less realistic tool in 
offsetting the regional employment problems of the past decade. 
Acquisition for many of the traditional recipients has been restrict­
ed not simply due to a reduction in the available pool of mobile 
investment per se, but also as they have become less attractive loc­
ations in the face of increasing competition from developing 
countries offering more favourable financial inducements, lower wage 
levels and higher productivity.
In spite of the difficulties outlined already, one country 
in particular has attracted attention in Europe, exhibiting a much 
more favourable performance in the face of recession than most of its 
counterparts. Ireland, contrary to past experience, has confounded 
many critics by achieving quite substantial economic and industrial 
growth in recent years, but more significantly because of the rapid 
recovery made from the worst years of recession in the middle of the 
last decade. In both 1977 and 1978 it was the fastest growing econ­
omy in the O.E.C.D. (O.E.C.D. 1979, p.6), with the value of exports 
rising by about 60% over this two year period.
It is in the area of industrial performance, however, rather 
than overall economic achievements, that most attention will be
devoted to in this thesis. Frequently referred to as the 'Irish 
miracle', one of the most notable aspects of development in recent 
years has been the rapid build-up of modern manufacturing activities 
in Ireland. Much interest, and indeed much anxiety has been express­
ed by fellow competitors at the phenomenal success experienced in 
attracting mobile investment in spite of fierce competition from 
elsewhere. Much of the credit for this must lie with the Industrial 
Development Authority (I.D.A.), a national organisation set up in 
1949 to advise on and promote industrial growth, which is now acknowl­
edged by many to be the foremost organisation of its type in Europe.
Ireland itself is a small, open and extremely centralised 
economy, but characterised also by internal problems of regional im­
balance in terms of population distribution, income, employment 
structure and growth and social opportunity. From a regional plann­
ing point of view, the significance of recent events in Ireland lies 
in how growth policies at a national level have been combined with 
programmes for regional economic development. This is particularly 
demonstrated in the context of industrial development. With no stat­
utory planning at a regional level, and very little power and even 
less resources in the hands of existing local authorities, it can be 
said that any regional planning which is carried out is largely the 
preserve of the I.D.A., being enacted through the Authority's 
'Regional Industrial Plans'. Some issues which need to be investi­
gated include the relationship between industrial and regional devel­
opment, and the role of the I.D.A. in fostering national regional 
policy aims.
One of the most important developments in Ireland's history 
was entry into the European Economic Community in 1973. Many tangible 
benefits from membership can be highlighted, notably in the fields of 
job creation and regional development, aided in particular, by access 
to new sources of finance, including the European Regional Development 
Fund (E.R.D.F.) and the European Investment Bank (E.I.B.). However, 
an important issue which has not been given adequate attention to date 
concerns the legislative straight-jacket within which much of E.E.C. 
policy is confined. A major question mark hangs over the present 
operations of the I.D.A. in the light of regulations and recent state­
ments concerning Competition Policy within the Community. Any decis-
ions taken regarding the type of aids which may be given to assist 
the setting up of industrial concerns and to influence their location 
could have major implications for the success of both regional and 
national development in Ireland. They could also have repercussions 
throughout the Community, particularly if exception is taken to any 
measures which have become accepted tools for regional economic prom­
otion .
Ireland's future would appear to lie as much at the hands of 
legislators outwith the country as well as those within, but one 
factor which cannot be ignored is the amazing demographic change in 
recent years, the repercussions of which will be immense in the not 
too distant future. Rapid population growth and high rates of immi­
gration both nationally and regionally may be considered by some as 
an indication of a change in economic fortune, but the possible 
implications, particularly on the employment front, may be less 
beneficial.
It is suggested therefore, that while recent economic perform­
ance has been encouraging, the future is clouded in uncertainty. Some 
of the reasons for this will, hopefully, become clear from the ensuing 
chapters.
CHAPTER 1
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT - A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
In the strictest sense, the economic history of Ireland (26 
counties) is short and relatively recent. Yet the development prob­
lems faced by successive Governments, and the policies adopted to 
tackle them can in large degree be said to have respectively stemmed 
from, and been a reaction to, the period of neo-colonial rule prior 
to Independence.
In its early years the country comprised of a dominant 
central city (Dublin) - the core of a successful, but small industrial 
enclave, existing within a predominantly agrarian economy. Potential 
for development was seriously impaired by the Partition agreement 
leading to the setting up of 'Two Irelands' in 1922, which appeared 
more favourable to 'the North', in terms of both urban development 
and structure of employment. Whereas 32% of the 26 county population 
were classed as 'urban' in 1926, the equivalent figure for Northern 
Ireland was 52% ('Ireland, Commission on Emigration', 1955, p.10). In 
1921 the proportion of population living in centres of 100,000 or more 
was 38% and 15% respectively in North and South (O'Neill, H.B., 1971, 
p.33). The structure of employment in both areas demonstrates similar 
differences: 36% of the Northern Ireland labour force was engaged in 
industry in 1926 compared with only 13.5% in the Republic. A further 
measure of structural imbalance is given by the fact that in the same 
year the proportion of the workforce in agriculture in the Republic 
(53%) was double that of the 'North' (27%) (O'Neill, H.B., 1971, p.35).
It is against this background - one akin to that of many Third 
World countries today, and one which, due to lack of resources (financ­
ial and other) necessitated a high degree of economic dependence on 
the U.K. for a considerable period - that the success or otherwise of 
economic development policies to date must be gauged.
1.1 General Ecananic Trends and Industrial Development
Assuming a decrease in the proportion of the workforce 
employed in the Primary sector to be a positive indication of economic
development, then it can be seen from Table 1, that there has been a 
marked improvement in the level of economic development of Ireland, 
particularly during the past two decades. Major policy initiatives 
have been directed throughout the period, at Secondary (industrial) 
employment growth in particular. Prior to the 1960's, this was done 
primarily through a very restrictive protectionist import substitut­
ion policy.
TABLE 1. Change in Employment Structure
Sector 1926 1936 1951 1961 1971 1977
Primary 53.5 49.6 40.9 36.1 25.9 20.8
Secondary 13.3 16.3 23.0 24.4 30.6 31.2
Tertiary 33.2 34.1 36.1 39.5 43.5 50.0
Source: Census of Population and Labour Force Surveys.
Two main phases of this early policy can be identified, both 
with strikingly different results. In the initial period, perhaps 
lasting into the late 1940's, manufacturing employment rose quite 
substantially compared with previous trends. Although starting from 
a low base - 4.6% of total employment - manufacturing employment 
increased by 67% in 1926-'36, and a further 43% in 1936-'51. Almost 
80,000 jobs were created in this sector over the period. 'Domestic' 
industrial growth was fostered by the imposition of high tariffs on 
imports and, additionally, by a ban on the foreign ownership of 
industrial concerns, enacted through the Control of Manufacturers 
Act. A substantial reduction in imports resulted: between 1931 and 
1935 imports of sugar fell from 78% to 31% of home market supplies, 
linen piece goods, 88% to 26%, and glass bottles and jars, 100% to 
32% (Flynn, 1972, p.52).
However, a number of less positive responses resulted from 
the above policy. Lack of competition led to fragmentation of pro­
duction units, and enabled numerous small scale and low productivity 
establishments to flourish. Due to a heavy reliance on 'home' 
materials most of the growth occurred in the food, drink and tobacco, 
and clothing and textiles sectors. Indeed, out of the ten most
important Irish industries (as measured in terms of value of net out­
put) in 1936, only two were outside these sectors, and only three ten 
years later (O'Neill, H.B., 1971, p.85). Overall, the industrial 
sector emerged as uncompetitive, poorly diversified in a sectoral 
sense, and overdiversified in terms of product range.
A policy of import substitution can only be successful as 
long as there are opportunities to substitute imported goods on the 
home market. Due to the small size of the domestic market, and as a 
consequence of the rapid expansion of manufacturing industry already 
outlined, these opportunities were soon exhausted. With little 
expansion into the export field - the only possible area for expans­
ion under a continuation of existing policies - there was relative 
stagnation of manufacturing industry throughout the 1950's. From 
1950 to 1959 employment rose by only 5.2% (7,000 jobs), (Census of 
Industrial Production). Total industrial employment in fact fell by 
over 23,000 in this same period, in spite of the fact that the 
industrial sector actually increased its proportionate share of nat­
ional employment. Export-led expansion was made difficult for three 
main reasons:- (1) low productivity and small plant size did not per­
mit economies of scale, (2) there was a lack of entrepreneurial 
skills, and (3) industry suffered from overdiversification. This 
latter point was perhaps the most important - the Committee on 
Industrial Organisation (C.I.O.) reporting in 1965 suggested that - 
"Overdiversification of production is perhaps the most
common problem in Irish industry ....  (resulting) in
short production runs with consequential high product­
ion costs." (Pr. 8082, 1965, p.20).
Thus by the end of the 1950's Irish industry was poorly 
equipped to meet any new challenge. Although the consequences of 
industrial decline had been somewhat offset by massive out-migration, 
this factor, and the realisation that previous policies had failed, 
was an important psychological blow. A new, and more radical policy 
approach to development was thus urgently required.
The publication of the White Paper,. "First Programme for 
Economic Expansion" in 1958, heralded the beginning of a new era 
characterised by free trade, and export-led growth through foreign
investment. In a complete reversal of existing policy it was 
announced that 'Government will welcome foreign participation in the 
drive for expansion in industry where it is likely to result in new 
industrial activity or an increase in our industrial exports' (1958 
White Paper, Part 5). With the long term aim of joining the 
European Community, and competing on equal terms in Europe it was 
essential that tariffs be reduced, but it could be argued that the 
dismantling of tariff barriers was carried out far too quickly, res­
ulting in the closure of many domestic manufacturers. The incentives 
available to foreign investors in effect subsidised competition with 
inefficient home producers. The long-term effect of the rapid change 
over to free-trade in the 1960's has been that -
"....  existing Irish industry, before it has managed to
build up at least a compensatory momentum of export- 
based expansion, has become increasingly exposed to 
tougher competition in its traditional home markets."
(Flynn, 1972, p.55).
However, significant advances were made throughout the 1960's 
both in terms of industrial employment creation, and export growth. 
Table 1 shows a significant reorientation in the relative importance 
to employment of the various sectors of the economy. From 1961 to 
1971 industrial employment expanded by 71,000 jobs, of which 44,200 
were in manufacturing (Johnson, J.H., 1975, p.221). Manufacturing 
exports, which comprised 6% of the total in 1950, and 18% in 1961, 
reached 41% of total merchandise exports by 1972. In 1969 industrial 
exports exceeded those from agriculture for the first time (Kennedy 
and Bruton, 1975, pp.52-53). Much of the growth can be attributed to 
incoming foreign investment. Schaffer (1977, p.239) notes that 
74% of industrial development in 1960-70 came from overseas. By 1974, 
60% of 'New Industry' (NI)1 was in overseas firms (McAleese, D., 1977, 
p.62). A further indication of economic expansion is given by per­
formance of G.N.P. - at constant prices it rose by 47% in 1961-'71, 
compared with 22% in the previous decade (McCarthy and Walker, 1977, 
p.10). This performance, must however, be put into perspective: in
1Refers to Industrial Development Authority's New Industry Programme, 
dealt with in detail in Ch. 4.
1973 G.N.P. in Ireland was only 50% of that of its European counter­
parts (Geary and Dempsey, 1977, p.19). The relative performance of 
Ireland will be looked at in greater detail in Chapter 2.
The expansion of industrial and export capacity has not been 
without its problems. The demand for raw materials by the industrial 
sector increased substantially, resulting in a rise in the value of 
industrial imports from 54 to 69% of the total in 1961-'72 (Kennedy 
and Bruton, 1975, p.126). This inevitably led to a 'widening of the 
current deficit in the balance of payments' (Durkan, 1978, p.33), 
particularly in the 1970's due to rising world oil prices, which was 
a major contributory factor to the mid-1970's economic recession.
Of most interest, however, is Ireland's performance post-recession. 
This will be returned to in Chapter 2, when it can be studied in com­
parison with that of some of its competitors.
Suffice it to say at present that, under new policy direct­
ion, the 1960's and 70's have been a period of almost uninterrupted 
growth for Ireland in terms of overall economic and industrial per­
formance. Significant advances have been made towards the objective 
of dragging the country from the status of a peasant nation to that 
of a modern, twentieth century economy.
1.2 Demographic Change and Eccnanic Performance
Until relatively recently, the single most important indi­
cator of economic prosperity in Ireland has without doubt been the 
pattern of demographic change, in particular as it is affected by 
migration. For the most part the demographic history of Ireland 
makes for depressing reading. The first major turning point can be 
attributed to the famine of the 1840's. In the ten years from 1841 
to 1851 the population decreased by more than 20%, from 6.5 million 
to 5.1 million (excluding Northern Ireland). The 1926 Census was 
the first to record a population below 3.0 million. With the except­
ion of a very short post-war boom in the late 1940's, the pattern of 
population loss continued unabated until the 1960's. Emigration was 
the chief cause of the losses throughout the entire period, reaching 
a peak rate of 42,400 per annum in 1956-'61. The decade of the 
1950's as a whole saw the biggest intercensal decrease in population
in the country's short history. Total population fell by 142,000, 
but this conceals the fact that a staggering 400,000 people emigrat­
ed in the same period. It was this factor perhaps more than any 
other which forced a change in development policy in the late 1950's.
The crisis of the 1950's showed without doubt that while 
Ireland had achieved political independence, there was a long way to 
go before economic independence became a reality. Johnson (1975, 
p.215) suggests that the high rates of out-migration recorded during 
this period of economic crisis were largely a consequence of post­
war economic recovery in Britain. Geary and Dempsey (1977, p.31) 
also suggest that in terms of emigration, in its reaction to unemploy 
ment, the non-agricultural unemployed behave as if Ireland were a 
region of Britain. From this it can be argued that the pattern of 
out-migration exhibited by Ireland is a reflection of the relative 
economic strength of that country's economy in comparison with that 
of receiving nations, in this case, chiefly Britain. This is an 
important factor to bear in mind when considering recent demographic 
performance.
The 1960's saw a marked slow-down in the rate of out-migrat­
ion, to -16,121 per annum in 1961-'66 and -10,781 in 1966-'71. Due 
to a higher rate of natural increase, the population decline was 
actually reversed in this period. Over the entire decade there was 
a net increase of almost 160,000 to the national population. However 
if the figures are to be believed, the 1970's has been the most remark 
able period to date in the Republic's demographic history. The 1979 
Census shows a net increase since 1971 of 386,633 persons, a rise of 
13%. In addition, there appears to have been a complete reversal in 
migration trends: from a pattern of continual net migration loss, the 
population increased by 106,800 through an inward flow of migrants, 
giving an annual increase of 13,350 attributable to migration.
These figures are quite astonishing in the light of project­
ions for the 1970's. Figures presented by Durkan (1978, p.46) indi­
cate a net migration loss of 8,000 from April 1971 to April 1978.
Ross and Walsh (1979, p.17) quote Keating as estimating an annual 
loss through migration of 5,330 from 1971 to 1977. Bearing in mind 
that these figures were derived from indices such as external pass­
enger movements and trends indicated by previous Census data, there 
seems every reason to question the accuracy of either or both of the 
1971 and 1979 Census figures. The huge discrepancy between the 
apparent and expected population trends would seem to suggest a sub­
stantial under-enumeration of the population in the 1971 Census.
Whatever the case, accepting the 1979 Census as fact, Ireland 
now faces new, but no less critical problems than those experienced 
in the past. Far from being an accurate reflection of the improved 
economic health of Ireland, it is suggested that the population growth 
and the in-migration of the 1970's reflects the poor state of the 
international economy as a whole. In particular, the recession in 
Britain has reduced the attractiveness of that country to Irish 
migrants. It is perhaps also the case that improved social welfare 
benefits in Ireland have attracted back many unemployed Irish from 
Britain. The present population structure in Ireland is an increas­
ingly dependent one. Part of the reason for this is in a lowering 
of the average age at marriage and higher birth rates, but Keenan 
(1978, p.194) also suggests that the composition of the immigrant 
population may also be a contributory factor: for 1971-'76 he suggests 
a net outflow of 15,000 in the over 14 age group being more than off­
set by a net inflow of 26,000 in the 0-14 age group. Without the 
safety-valve of out-migration this puts serious pressure onto social 
finance, and has serious implications for the size of the potential 
workforce in the not too distant future, putting a considerable prem­
ium on job creation programmes. The ability of these programmes to 
keep pace with population increase will be the most crucial issue 
facing Ireland in the very near future.
CHAPTER 2
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT versus REGIONAL EQUALISATION
In any discussion of development policy the regional imbalance 
in the distribution of population, employment and social capital, 
features as prominantly as the problems of the national economy as a 
whole. Yet early policy initiatives did little to alleviate these 
regional problems - overall national development was the paramount 
objective of both the protectionist era, and of the 1958 Plan for 
Expansion. This latter plan was based largely on a document - 
"Economic Development" - by T.K. Whitaker, the then Head of the Civil 
Service, published earlier in the same year. He laid particular 
emphasis on the need to regard the country, for development purposes, 
as a single economic unit, arguing against the practicality of any 
policy which tried to ensure an even growth of employment opportunit­
ies throughout the country.
In the Irish political arena, however, with a very strong and 
vocal rural vote, any policy which discriminates against the less 
developed areas is likely to meet with strong opposition. Stressing 
national development above all else actively fosters the idea of two 
nations - a few prosperous urban areas versus the rest - a situation 
which is anathema to most politicians. Some of the arguments for and 
against such a policy will be discussed below, but beforehand the rel­
ative strengths of the national economy, and of the various regions 
will first be outlined.
2.1 National Performance in a Wider Perspective
In spite of substantial growth in both output and employment 
in the 1960's, most indices of development show Ireland still lagging 
well behind the recognised 'developed' nations in terms of aggregate 
economic performance. Membership of the European Economic Community 
(E.E.C.) since 1973 has not only exposed the country to increased com­
petition in both industry and agriculture, but has also revealed the 
quite considerable gap which has to be bridged before Ireland can be 
considered on a par with the other Member States in terms of overall 
development status.
TABLE 2. Trends in Per Capita G.D.P.
1970 
G.D.P. (u.a.) %E•E •C • G.D.P.
1975
%E.E •C .
Average 
Annual Increase
Belg. 2619 106.6 4757 121.8 12.7
Den. 3160 128.7 5397 138.2 11.3
Ger. 3058 124.5 5149 131.9 11.0
Fra. 2776 113.0 4728 121.1 11.2
Irl. 1317 53.6 1902 48.7 7.6
It. 1727 70.3 2330 59.7 6.2
Lux. 3129 127.4 4538 116.2 7.7
Neth. 2429 98.9 4444 113.8 12.8
U.K. 2182 88.8 3020 77.4 6.7
E.E.C. 2456 100 3904 100 9.7
Source: Bull, of the E.C., Supplement 7, 1976: E.R.D.F. First
Annual Report.
TABLE 3. Index of Unit Wage Costs
Irl . U .K. Ger . Fra . It . Jap .
1971 110 10.0 109 9.0 107 7.0 106 6.0 111 11.0 111 11.0
1972 122 10.9 113 3.7 109 1.9 109 2.8 113 1.8 118 6.3
1973 134 9.8 121 7.1 114 4.6 117 7.3 124 9.7 126 6.8
1974 156 16.4 150 23.9 123 7.9 125 15.4 147 18.5 163 29.4
1975 198 26.9 196 30.7 127 3.3 163 20.7 196 33.3 194 19.0
1976 213 7.6 221 12.7 126 -0.8 169 3.7 218 11.2 186 -4.1
1977 239 12.2 246 11.3 132 4.8 185 9.5 263 20.6 192 3.2
1978 261 8.4 279 13.4 135 2.3 203 9.7 295 12.5 194 1.0
Source: Programme for National Development, 1978-81, p.104.
Table 2, showing per capita G.D.P. for the nine E.E.C. States, 
clearly indicates the extent of the problem facing Ireland. In 1970 
the gap between Irish G.D.P. and the E.E.C. average was 46.4 percent­
age points. By 1975 the position had worsened further, the difference 
then being 51.3 percentage points. The gap between Ireland, the low­
est, and Denmark, the highest, also widened substantially, from 75.1 
percentage points in 1970 to 89.5 in 1975. On a more restricted geo­
graphical scale, the highest per capita G.D.P. recorded in 1975 was in 
Hamburg, followed by Paris, these being respectively 5 and 4 times that 
of the worst area - the West of Ireland (Bull, E.C., Supplement 7, 1976
pp.6-8).
The dominance of the primary sector in Ireland's employment 
structure also suggests economic backwardness. In 1971, only Italy 
with 19.5% of its workforce in agriculture came close to Ireland's fig­
ure of 26.5%, and even here there was a substantial gap; and compares 
unfavourably with an E.E.C. average of around 11.0% (Kennedy and Bruton 
1975, p.12). Similarly, the industrial sector was the least developed 
amongst the nine Member States, employing only 30.8% of the workforce, 
compared with 44.1% in Italy and 49.5% in Germany. While the agricult­
ural sector has continued to contract, and manufacturing employment has 
shown little net gain throughout the 1970's, being badly affected by 
the mid-70's recession, tertiary sector employment has expanded right 
through the period. This is in accord with an N.E.S.C. Report on tert­
iary sector employment (No. 28, 1977, Pr. 5841, p.10), which suggested 
that 'service type' employment would expand by 118,000 jobs in the per­
iod 1974-'80. An interesting point is a suggestion in the Report that 
30% of manufacturing employment, and 25% of the entire industrial work­
force were employed in industrial services in 1971. The growth of this 
type of employment could have considerable implications for the success 
of employment policies pursued, which at present would seem to rely 
heavily on promoting manufacturing employment growth, almost to the 
exclusion of the services sector.
An interesting hypothesis is suggested by the above employment, 
and by urbanisation trends in recent years. Most policies to date seem 
to stem from the assumption that the course of development must follow 
that of the other industrialised nations. This implies that a dominant
secondary employment base, and a high level of urbanisation are pre­
requisites to economic advancement. It may be the case, however, that
such a course is not entirely suited to an Ireland developing out of
phase with the other developed nations. Walsh and Ross (1978, p.311) 
for example, argue for -
"....  consideration of a wider range of employment than
is customary in regional policy and also for the explor­
ation of the possibility of the regions of Ireland jump­
ing the manufacturing stage."
Looking at the pattern of urbanisation and internal migration, it has 
been further commented that -
"The remarkable feature of the renewal of population 
growth in much of the rural area of Ireland is the
fact that it occurred at such an early stage in the
process of urbanisation, and in the face of a con­
tinuing decline in the numbers engaged in agricult­
ure." (Ross, 1979, p.28).
The 15 Urban Districts (U.D.'s) in excess of 10,000 inhabitants, con­
tained 41.5% of the national population in 1979, an increase of only 
0.7 percentage points in 1971, and this in the face of a 13% increase 
in the national population during the same period.1 In fact, the 
proportion of the population described as 'urban' only surpassed 50%
in 1971, compared with 73.5% in the U.S.2 It is surprising therefore,
that Ireland, at a significantly lower level of urbanisation should 
exhibit the same internal migration trends as those of the more 
'highly developed' United States, at almost the same time. This seems 
to lend credence, therefore, to the suggestion that Irish development 
is following a distinctly different path than those of other 'Western' 
countries.
Ireland also exhibited a markedly different response to the 
world economic recession of 1974-'75, suffering less severely, and 
recovering more rapidly than most. G.N.P. performance in the few 
years prior to the recession was consistently below the O.E.C.D. aver­
age - a growth of 4.3% as against 5.5% in the years 1959/60 to 1972/73.
1derived from Census of Population Ireland, 1979.
21970 figure, U.S. Statistical Abstracts, 1971, p.16.
In 1974 real G.N.P. grew by 1.5% in Ireland, while that of the O.E.C.D. 
increased by only 0.3%. The figures for 1975 show the full impact of 
recession, but the decline in G.N.P. in Ireland, at -0.2% was only a 
fifth of the O.E.C.D. average (Durkan, 1978, p.45). A much stronger 
performance was evident in the post-recession years. In both 1977 and 
1978 Ireland was the fastest growing economy in the O.E.C.D., with 
real G.D.P. expanding by 5^% and 7% respectively. Gross fixed capital 
investment also made a remarkable recovery: from a net decrease of 5.7% 
in 1975, it grew by 8.4% in 1977 and by a further 15% in 1978 (O.E.C.D. 
1979, pp.6-7). By this date output had also recovered to pre-recession 
levels, but not so employment - in the Third Quarter of 1977 it was 
still almost 5 percentage points below the pre-depression level (Kennedy 
and Foley, 1978, p.89).
decrease in the rate of wage inflation (Table 3) compared with that of 
many of its competitors, Ireland, post-recession, became increasingly 
attractive to overseas investors. An increase of 161% in unit wage 
costs in Ireland during 1971-78 compares quite favourably with the 
other countries listed, especially since (a) wage rates in Ireland were 
relatively low to start with, and (b) as the figures are expressed as
f)
national as opposed to notional currency changes, the actual increases 
in Ireland were lower than in most other countries, due to exchange 
rate differences. More impressive perhaps is the decrease in wage 
inflation after 1975, particularly in comparison with near neighbour, 
and at that time 'currency equal', U.K.. In fact, performance before 
and after 1975 would seem to support the view that the recession was 
neither^ so prolonged, nor as severe in Ireland as in many of its 
counterparts.
formance. The value of exports rose by 35.5% in 1977, and a further 
17.5% in 1978, (Table 4). The total volume of exports grew by about 
13% in this period. Although overall there was a marked decrease in 
the rate of export expansion in 1978 compared with the previous year -
"....  when set against the volume growth of O.E.C.D.
imports of about 5% in 1978, Irish export performance 
was extremely strong and reflected a continuation of 
the coming-on-stream of new export based industry." 
(O.E.C.D., 1979, p.16).
With a more rapid increase in output and productivity and a
This view is further enhanced by a look at recent export per-
The increase in industrial output and exports, without any 
significant accompanying increase in employment, would suggest that 
there has been a structural shift in the make-up of industrial out­
put. Indeed the recession forced many manufacturers in traditional 
product lines to modernise, rationalise, or in many cases, to cease 
production. Kennedy and Foley (1978, p.89) suggest a high "... degree 
of outright closure of marginal firms and the entry of more new firms 
with high productivity levels". This in part could explain the per­
formance of the other component of external trade. From 1976 to 1978 
(Table 4) imports rose at an even faster rate than exports, the larg­
est components of which were in general, producers capital goods and
TABLE 4. Growth in External Trade, 1976-78 (%)
1976 1977 1978
Exports 28.4 35.5 17.5
- of which Industrial 41.1 40.6 17.1
Agricultural 12.0 26.8 18.6
Imports 37.2 32.0 20.0
- of which Producers Capital
Goods 30.9 27.9 30.8
Consumer Goods 37.5 13.5 28.3
Materials for 
further production 38.5 41.6 14.5
Trade Deficit (£m) 451.0 611.0 734.0
Source: O.E.C.D. Economic Surveys , Ireland (1979) p.17.
materials for further production - chiefly, therefore, the result of 
the demands of an increasingly modern industrial sector. This is the 
continuation of a trend evident for a considerable period, indicating 
a strong relationship between industrial expansion and spiralling 
imports - from a sample of 25 countries, from 1972 to 1977, Ireland 
ranks fifth in the rate of increase of imports. The effects on the 
trade balance are only too obvious, and spell considerable danger for 
the economy in the future unless a larger proportion of new industry 
needs can be supplied from the home market.
Having outlined a picture of rapid economic growth and expans­
ion in Ireland, particularly in the latter half of the 1970's, it 
should be noted that this presents a rather misleading impression as 
to the economic health of the country today. Many of the high growth 
rates achieved were only possible because of the low base level from 
which expansion occurred, and would be virtually impossible to attain 
in a more developed economy. Those who support the view that national 
development demands far greater priority than righting internal imbal­
ances will still argue that in spite of recent promising economic per­
formance, Ireland's development status remains virtually unaltered. 
Comparisons with other nations in, for example, the E.E.C. would provide 
strong support for this view, but whether it is a realistic view in 
political, and more particularly, social equity terms may be judged 
from the following section.
2.2 Regional Imbalance - the East-West Problem
A Report by the European Commission (E.C.) on the regional 
problems of the enlarged community (COM(73), 550 final, 1973) stated 
the following -
"The fundamental cause of regional imbalances stems from 
the absence of modern economic activity or the over­
dependence of a region on backward agricultural or 
declining industrial activities, which are therefore un­
able to guarantee a satisfactory rate of productivity, 
employment and income; and where there are no compensat­
ory factors in terms of alternative expanding sources of 
employment." (p.9).
The above statement could be applied equally to the regional problems 
of Ireland as to those of the E.E.C. as a whole. The same Report, 
outlining the moral justification for a regional policy, also argued 
that -
"....  it is unthinkable that the Community should only
lead to an increase in the process whereby wealth is 
principally attracted to places where it exists already."
(p. 1) .
Both these points should be borne in mind in any consideration of the 
case for or against priority attention to regional as opposed to nat­
ional development strategies in Ireland.
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In the discussion below, regional imbalance will be considered 
under the following headings: (a) population distribution, (b) regional 
variation in income, and (c) distribution of employment. It should be 
noted that for statistical and planning purposes the country is 
(usually) divided into nine regions (Fig. 1). In the administering of 
regional aid the country is also divided into Development Areas (D.A.'s) 
and Non-Development Areas (N.D.A.'s), which sub-divide it along a line 
running approximately from north-east to south-west. Additionally, for 
some forms of aid, Dublin County is treated separately (Fig. 2).
(a) Generalising, in terms of population distribution, Ireland
could be said to consist of 'Dublin and the Irish Desert'. An E.C. 
Report (1973, Annex p.23) suggested that -
"Leaving out the region of the capital city, the density 
(of population) is so low everywhere that one can hardly 
speak of concentration or increased concentration."
Table 5 gives an indication of the skewed nature of the population 
distribution. More than a third of the entire population lived in
TABLE 5. Population: Regional Distribution and Change
Region
% National Population 
1971 1979
Popn. 
Increase 
1971 - 79
%
Increase
% Increase 
through 
migration
Per annum 
net migration/ 
1000 popn.
E 35.7 37.3 191,964 18.1 30.8 6.4
SW 15.6 15.3 50,361 10.8 26.9 3.5
SE 11.0 10.9 37,880 11.5 21.3 2.9
NE 5.8 5.7 16,280 9.4 12.5 1.4
MW 9.1 8.9 30,841 11.4 20.7 2.8
DON. 3.6 3.6 13,255 12.2 46.8 6.7
MIDS. 7.8 7.5 19,450 8.4 19.1 1.9
W 8.7 8.4 22,795 8.8 26.8 2.8
NW 2.6 2.4 3,801 4.8 58.7 2.4
STATE 100.0 100.0 386,633 13.0 27.6 14.2
Sources National Census, 1979.
the East region in 1971, and by 1979 its dominance had been 
strengthened even further, due to the magnetism of the city of 
Dublin. The East region alone accounted for almost 50% of the 
increase in the national population in the inter-Censal period 
from 1971-'79. With the exception of Donegal, which maintained 
its position, every other region, excluding the East, experienced 
a decrease in proportionate share of the national population in 
this period, and this in spite of the stated aim to restrict the 
expansion of Dublin.
However, outside of the East region, a definite pattern seems 
to be emerging which gives some cause for optimism. In the rel­
atively prosperous regions, such as the South East, South West, 
North East and Mid-West, the largest proportion of the population 
increase can be explained by natural growth rather than migration. 
This can also be said for the East region, but the absolute growth 
involved in this case still gives cause for concern. In contrast 
the depressed regions of Donegal and the North West experienced 
very heavy in-migration, accounting for almost 60% of the increase 
in the North West. Excluding the East, the highest percentage 
increase in regional population was attained in Donegal (+12.2%). 
One possible explanation for these increases might be the attract­
ion of new employment created in these regions through the efforts 
of the Industrial Development Authority, but at the same time the 
proviso concerning the reliability of the Census data should also 
be considered. (N.B. Industrial performance will be studied in 
greater detail in Chapter 4.)
At the county level, two distinct trends can be observed in 
the 70's. The first, which has already been referred to in the 
case of Donegal, is the reversal of migration trends in the count­
ies of the D.A.'s. Sligo, for example, changed from a net 
decrease of 6.1% in 1961-'71 to a net increase of 8.6% in 1971-'79. 
Similar figures for Longford and Mayo are -7.8% to +8.9% and 
-11.2% to +3.9% respectively. Only one county continued to show 
a decrease - Lectrim - but even here a rate of -15.3% was reduced 
to -1.9% in the above periods.
A second, and perhaps more disturbing trend in the light of 
regional policy objectives is the very large rate of increase in 
the counties surrounding Dublin, ranging from +26.4% in Wicklow, 
to +34.9% in Kildare, these being explained almost entirely by an 
extension of commuting from the capital.
One of the perceived major drawbacks to development outside 
the East region is the poorly developed network of sizeable 
urban centres. In 1979 thirteen of the twenty-six counties had 
no town in excess of 10,000 inhabitants, and six of these could 
not even boast a settlement of 5,000 people. At a regional level, 
two of the nine planning regions did not have a focal centre of
10,000 people, and a further three only had one. However, even 
in the South East region, with five sizeable urban centres 
(10,000+), no single dominant centre had emerged by 1979. Each 
serves its own relatively local hinterland, the attraction of 
Dublin apparently being too great to warrant a strengthening of 
intra-regional linkages between these centres. A study by 
O'Farrell (1978, p.173) indicated that town size had a signifi­
cant influence on the attractiveness of a region to investors.
He concluded that -
"....  a modest degree of urbanisation was a necessary
pre-requisite for generating substantial manufacturing 
growth in the regions."
Thus it could be concluded that the existing urban structure of 
most of the regions to some extent hinders regional economic 
development.
(b) An important indication of the relative strengths of the
various regions, in economic terms at least, is given by changes 
which have occurred in per capita personal income (Table 6).
Once again, the income in the East region is far in excess of 
that elsewhere, but some narrowing of the gap between the best 
and worst regions has taken place; decreasing from about 40 per­
centage points in 1969 to 32 by 1977. An important point to 
note, however, is that difference between the top and bottom 
within Ireland, is far less than that between Ireland as a whole 
and the most prosperous Member States in the E.E.C.. Neverthe-
TABLE 6. Regional Per Capita Personal Income (£). 
__________ Expressed as % of East Region___________
1969 1973 1977 % Change
Region £ % £ % £ % 1969-73 1973-77
E 517 100.0 653 100.0 691 100 26.3 5.8
SE 380 73.5 529 81.0 556 80.5 39.2 5.1
SW 409 79.1 551 84.4 593 85.8 34.7 7.6
MW 391 75.6 535 81.9 559 80.9 36.8 4.4
W 324 62.7 459 70.3 517 74.8 41.4 12.6
NW 316 61.1^1
435 66.6 470 68.0 8.0
DON 305 59.0 j
MIDS 325 62.7 463 70.9 480 69.5 42.5 3.6
NE 380 73.5 508 77.8 535 77.4 33.7 5.3
STATE 420 81.2
Source: Schaffer, B. (1979), p.247, and Fraser of Allander
Institute, Strathclyde Univ. (unpublished).
less the income range within Ireland gives no cause for complac­
ency, in spite of improvements which have taken place. These 
shifts may be an indication of some measure of success in dis­
persing new development away from Dublin, but another major con­
tributory factor could be additional income derived, not from 
national regional policy initiatives, but rather through the 
operation of the E.E.C. agricultural policy, which would tend to 
favour the already prosperous agricultural regions - in the S.E. 
and S.W. regions, for example, the proportion of the regional 
income derived through the agricultural sector actually increased 
between 1973 and 1977,1 in spite of decreasing numbers involved 
in agriculture.
(c) A further two factors used in assessing the need for a strong
regional element to any national development programme are the
Unpublished data supplied to author by Fraser of Allander Institute, 
Strathclyde University.
TABLE 7. Structure of Employment (Expressed as % of 
__________ Regional Labour Force)_____________________
Region
Primary 
1971 1977
Secondary 
1971 1977
Tertiary 
1971 1977
Unemployment 
1971 1977
E 5.9 4.3 36.2 30.8 53.0 55.6 4.8 9.5
SE 30.7 26.5 25.7 27.8 35.3 36.5 5.1 9.3
SW 27.5 24.1 28.4 28.9 38.2 38.3 5.9 8.7
MW 32.2 22.3 25.7 27.9 35.6 39.1 6.5 10.6
W 47.4 37.1 15.3 19.9 29.2 31.4 8.1 11.6
NW/DON 40.4 30.4 18.9 23.1 28.9 30.2 12.2 16.2
MIDS 40.6 33.9 22.0 23.9 31.3 33.4 6.1 8.7
NE 30.6 25.9 31.1 30.1 30.8 33.4 7.0 10.7
Source: Fraser of Allander Institute, Strathclyde University
(unpublished).
TABLE 8. Regional Distribution of Employment
Region
Total 
1975 1977
Industrial 
1975 1977
Manufacturing
1977
1981 (ests.)1 
Total Employment Manufacturing
E 37.8 38.9 42.2 42.5 43.8 39.6 41.2
SE 10.9 10.4 10.9 10.2 10.4 10.4 10.4
SW 15.6 15.2 16.7 15.5 15.4 15.0 15.5
MW 8.6 10.4 8.6 9.0 9.3 8.9 9.3
W 8.3 8.5 5.0 6.1 5.5 8.3 6.1
NW/DON 5.5 5.4 4.0 4.8 4.7 5.5 5.6
MIDS 7.3 6.9 6.3 5.8 4.0 6.8 4.7
NE 5.9 5.7 6.2 6.1 6.9 5.9 7.1
1Assumes all employment targets achieved.
Source: European Commission?
structure of employment in the individual regions, and the reg­
ional distribution of industrial/manufacturing employment (Tables 
7 and 8). Here too, there is a marked contrast between the East 
region and 'the rest1. The former appears to have an over-rep- 
resentation of tertiary sector employment and a striking under­
representation of primary sector employed, when compared with the 
other regions. In this respect it exhibits a pattern which is 
perhaps more characteristic of a well developed urban industrial 
society, such as that of the U.K., than of the 'transition' econ­
omy which is characteristic of the remainder of the country.
The employment figures in Table 8 give little comfort to 
those living outside the East region, which continued to increase 
its share of total national employment. Its share of industrial 
employment also increased in 1975-'77, in spite of considerable 
manufacturing employment losses as a result of the recession.
More heartening from the regional development viewpoint, however, 
is the increase in the share of industrial employment attributed 
to the less prosperous North West/Donegal and West regions (these 
trends will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 4).
In view of the regional disparities outlined above a major 
dilemma faces policy planners. A policy of national interest first 
and regional interests second might heighten the regional imbalances, 
at least in the short-run. Indeed, the long-term consequences for 
some of the already depressed regions could be disasterous, by depriv­
ing them of the resources to maintain minimum standards now, suffic­
ient to provide a secure base on which to expand in a future period 
of prosperity. Alternatively, if regional equality is to over-ride 
national prosperity as an objective, what model should development 
policies aim at? Is the employment structure of the East region the 
most suitable for the other regions, or can a compromise be reached 
which will satisfy the demands of the other regions?
The following section will outline more fully some of the 
I arguments of the regional policy debate, particularly over the last 
two decades.
2.3 Regional Policy - A Case of Positive Evasion?
Although the subject of considerable academic and political 
discussion beforehand, the publication of the Buchanan Report in 1968 
(An Foras Forbartha, 1968) was an important landmark in Irish region­
al policy debate. The Consultant recommended that, in the interests 
of overall national growth, investment and population should be 
highly concentrated on nine urban focal points, including the capital. 
The prime objective of national growth was to be articulated through 
joint planning authorities operating in each of eight delineated 
regions. For its apparent emphasis on the need for a growth pole 
policy the Report received much academic acclaim, but slightly more 
reserved approval in political circles (Fig. 2).
Nevertheless, many of the recommendations were incorporated 
into the 'Third Programme for Economic and Social Development', pub­
lished the following year, although at times the policy and objective 
seemed somewhat contradictory. It was stated, for example, that - 
"With the development of industry through growth
centres ....  and the application of local and regional
development plans, a better balance between agricult­
ural and non-agricultural activities will enable present 
levels of population to be maintained in many rural 
areas."
Surely, though, the main effect of a growth centre policy would be 
to attract people away from the rural areas, altering the balance of 
population in favour of the expanding urban settlements, and largely 
at the expense of the rural areas, in population terms at least!
Inconsistency continued to be the key word with the simult­
aneous publication three years later of the Government's statement 
on regional policy, and the Regional Industrial Plans of the I.D.A., 
for the period 1973-'77. In an about-turn in its attitude towards 
growth centres, the Government policy statement argued the need to 
opt for -
"....  the maximum spread of development through all
the regions, giving an increased and wider range of 
economic and social opportunities, and so minimising 
population dislocation through internal migration."
Contrary to most academic opinion, Ross and Walsh give some support 
to such a dispersal policy, arguing that -
"It is possible that a policy of dispersal has more 
economic justification than is generally acknowledged 
by academic economists, and that this justification 
will grow in the future." (1979, p.9).
The I.D.A. Industrial Plans, which Ross suggests "....  came closest
to formulating a national settlement strategy" (1978, p.308), and 
which were fully endorsed in the Government's 1972 statement, do not, 
on the other hand, accord with the 'maximum dispersal' aim - 
"A policy of complete dispersal would require a job 
distribution pattern which brought jobs as near to 
each man's door as he required. Clearly such a 
policy would not be feasible." (I.D.A., 1972, Pt. I, 
p.i) •
What was suggested was a compromise along the concentration dispersal 
continuum -
".....  a balanced development of the whole country
which recognised both the value of some concentrat­
ion at industrial estates in the major towns as 
well as the needs of small communities." (Ross,
1978, p.308).
The main criticism of Buchanan's growth centre strategy was that the 
arguements used to support it were empirically weak. The policy of 
concentration was based largely on an assumption that the level of 
job creation would vary indirectly with the number of development 
centres. Work by O'Neill (1971) would, however, seem to support this 
viewpoint. From a study of industrial closures she concludes that -
"....  the process of industrialisation in an economy
like Ireland, and thus the process of economic devel­
opment itself in such a country, would be more assured 
of success if industrial establishments were arranged 
in groups of similar or related firms, within the 
large industrial clusters of the urban agglomerations."
(p.117).
She further suggests that -
"....  the only sound policy of industrial location
is one based on selected centres, small in number
and large in size." (p.118).
O'Neill in fact appears to advocate a policy of even greater concen­
tration than Buchanan, based on the view that only Dublin and Cork 
are of a size sufficient to offer significant agglomeration econom­
ies , and also on the evidence of very high industrial failure rates 
in Buchanan's 'regional' growth centres, in the period 1946-'66 
(p.151). To date no study has conclusively proved that dispersal has 
not been detrimental in terms of job losses. O'Farrell's work (1975,
p.39) indicating little variation in New Industry failure rate by
town size, is inconclusive, since no account is taken of variation in 
plant size.
In terms of population distribution, the official Government 
estimates of the 9 'growth centres' in 1991 seem to correlate strongly 
with the trends suggested by Buchanan to 1986 (Table 9), and thus by 
implication would appear to support or recognise as inevitable, the
TABLE 9. Population of Urban Growth Centres, 1971-91 (OOP's)
1971 19861 19912
Dublin 850 1125 1125-1200
Cork 175 250 300-360
Limerick/Shannon/Ennis 79 190 165-175
Waterford 33 55 50-60
Galway 29 47 55-65
Dundalk 24 44 40-45
Droghoda 20 35 36-40
Sligo 14 25-30 30-35
Athlone 11 18 16-20
Total 1235 1789-1794 1817-2000
State 2971 3498 3600-3800
Estimates from Buchanan Report
2Government 'Review of Regional Policy', 4th May, 1972
Source: The Irish Times, May 1972.
emergence of growth centres. Buchanan1s estimate for the population 
in these centres was 51.3% of the total by 1986. The Government 
statement bears a strong resemblance to this, with 50.5-52.6% being 
in these nine towns by 1991. The incompatibility of the Government's 
population strategy with its stated regional policy objectives is 
further revealed in an article appearing in the 'Irish Times' shortly 
after publication of the Statement, which suggested that -
"....  the implications for rural areas under this
(the Government's) strategy may be even less promis­
ing than the scenario depicted in the controversial
Buchanan Report ....  The conclusion must be (from
estimates of population growth in centres of 5000+
inhabitants in 1966, excluding the growth centres)
that the population residing in rural areas and 
towns of less than 5,000 inhabitants will decline by 
33-50,000 persons."
The matter is confused still further by the fact that the I.D.A. was 
expected to promote industrial development to accord spatially with 
the Government's population projections, a course which clearly could 
not be carried out without dispensing with the dispersal aim. The 
fact that emphasis has not been put so strongly on the growth centres,
is, however, perhaps vindicated by the recent internal migration
trends already discussed, which suggest a less concentrated population 
pattern as being likely in the future. From 1971 to 1979 the proport­
ion of the total population contained in Buchanan's growth centres 
increased only very slightly, from 41.6% to 42.0%,1 much of this being 
accounted for by Dublin, and to a lesser extent the Cork Area, and 
Galway.
Moving away from statistical debate, which has perhaps pres­
ented much discussion of the real planning issues, a boost to regional 
development was given with the creation of a new Government Department 
of Economic Planning and Development in 1977. In a speech in the Dail 
(10th May, 1979) the Minister for Economic Planning and Development 
outlined three main principles which guided the development of region­
al policy:-
1Author's estimate, derived from 1979 Census of Population.
1. equity demands a fair distribution of development throughout 
the regions;
2. national development can be maximised only if the special 
development potential of each region is realised;
3. legitimate regional interests should be given an effective
voice in regional development.
For a time then, it appeared as if some of the needs and aspirations 
of the regions were being recognised by Central Government. The 
recognition that national development could not be divorced from that
of the regions, and that the regions themselves should have a role in
determining their own directions in the future was indeed a major 
step in such a centralist country as Ireland. As it turns out it was 
too big a step - the recent demise of the newly created Department 
(above) under a Government reshuffle earlier this year, once again 
shows a lack of clear commitment by the central authorities to region­
al planning as a legitimate policy process.
As can be seen from the preceding pages it is virtually 
impossible to point to any clear-cut policy aimed specifically at 
regional development. Most Government statements on the matter have 
been both superficial, and at the same time contradictory. To many 
observers, the fact that some regions have actually improved their 
development status over the years, is fortuitous rather than the res­
ult of a positive development policy. The following chapter will 
look in greater detail at the extent to which regional and more local 
needs are being catered for within the present national planning 
framework.
CHAPTER 3
THE DEVELOPMENT OF PLANNING
Two distinctive, but not necessarily mutually exclusive 
levels of planning are considered here in the Irish context. The 
first, at the national level, is by definition economic planning and 
is well developed in Ireland, drawing particularly from the French 
experience of National Plan formulation. The second, at the regional 
level, concerned more with the achievement of desired social object­
ives, than with economic targets, is very much in its infancy. While 
the idea of regional planning has been nominally supported in polit­
ical circles, evidence to this author would suggest that, with a few 
exceptions, its further development on the ground has yet to be act­
ively encouraged. This point will become clearer in the ensuing dis­
cussion on the Regional Development Organisations. It is intended, 
firstly, however, to look at national level planning, and to comment 
on the success or otherwise of the development programmes to date. 
Attention will then focus on regional planning - the initiatives which 
have been taken to date, and possible future directions.
3.1 National Planning Programmes
(a) Programmes for Economic Expansion
In reaction to the period of 'non-plan' which in part led to 
the disasterous economic stagnation of the 1950's, the Government pub­
lished a White Paper - The First Programme for Economic Expansion, in 
1958, which was to guide the country towards a period of economic 
prosperity in the 1960's. This was to be achieved by a switch of 
resources from social to 'productive' investment, the aim being to 
generate growth by stimulating greater private investment, leading to 
a considerable expansion in exports. Following on from earlier legis­
lation - The Industrial Development (Encouragement of External Invest­
ment) Act, 1958 - considerable emphasis was put on the attraction of 
foreign investment -
"..... we must be prepared to welcome foreign partici­
pation, financial and technical, in new industrial 
activities aimed at exports."
A slight upturn in economic fortune did take place during the period 
of the First Programme. The only target which was set was a real 
growth rate of 2% for the duration of the Programme - 1958 to 1963.
This in fact was easily surpassed, with an annual average growth rate 
of about 4^% (Kennedy and Bruton, 1975, p.153) over the period. How 
much this was directly attributable to the Programme is, however, 
difficult to ascertain.
Spurred on by the apparent success of the First Programme, the 
Government launched a slightly more ambitious Second Programme for 
Economic Expansion, covering a longer period than the First, from 1964 
to 1970. In this growth targets were set, not just for the economy as 
a whole, but also, after consultation with industrial leaders, for 
individual industrial sectors. This Programme marked a change to 
'indicative planning' (Fitzgerald, 1968, p.197), but has been severely 
criticised for major methodological weaknesses. A 50% growth in G.D.P. 
to 1970 was assumed as a matter of course, and individual sectoral 
targets were arrived at on the basis of this projected growth. No
indication was given as to how these targets were to be achieved, and
no formal mechanism existed to ensure that they were. Fitzgerald has 
pointed out that -
"....  even where Departments indicated their targets,
in most cases no attempt was subsequently made each
year to measure performance against these targets."
(1968, p.203).
The failure to achieve the set targets led to the abandonment of this 
Programme after a mid-term review, in 1968. It was replaced by the
Third Programme for Economic and Social Development, in 1969, cover­
ing the four year period 1969-'72, which also had many of the method­
ological failings of its predecessor -
"It failed to recognise that the ultimate set of 
unknowns in any policy problem, are not the pro­
jections or the targets, but rather the instru­
ments." (Norton, 1975, p.30).
Its one redeeming feature, from a social planning point of view was 
that it did consider policies to be adopted in the areas of incomes 
and social policy, and also gave some consideration to the type of 
spatial framework which might be most advantageous to promote in the 
interests of national economic development.
In a general criticism of the type of planning represented in 
Ireland by the above three Programmes, Norton has argued that - 
"Setting up a list of objectives without indicating 
how they are to be attained does not constitute a 
policy or plan; it is rather a statement of mere 
aspirations." (1975, p.ix).
This perhaps is a reflection of the non-commital attitude towards 
planning as a process in Ireland, which Fitzgerald suggests -
" in both public and private sectors has
remained in some degree peripheral rather than central 
to the policy-making process." (1968, p.206).
The final point comes from Kennedy (1974, p.60), who with hindsight 
argued that -
"There is little point in planning when there are no 
policies to ensure that the plan will be implemented.
Planning in future should be concerned as much with 
how things should be done as with what should be 
done."
(b) National/Regional Development Programmes
No new programme replaced the Third Programme (above) when it 
expired in 1972. However, the European Commission now requires that 
each of the E.E.C. members produce annually 'regional development 
programmes', which are used in connection with assessment of the 
Members claims on 'Regional Development Fund' finances. As Ireland, 
for regional aid purposes, constitutes a single region within the E.E.C., 
its Programmes in large degree constitute a statement of overall nat­
ional policy objectives.
The central document in the first Regional Development Pro­
gramme submitted by Ireland to the European Commission was a White 
Paper "National Development, 1977-1980".1 The main strategy outlined 
was to effect a reduction in unemployment through a rapid increase in 
overall employment, a marked decrease in the rate of inflation, and a 
sustained high level of growth, while also -
xWhite Paper "Programme for National Development 1977-1980", Dublin 
1978 - also published as "Regional Development Programme, Ireland,
1977-'80", COM. E.C. Regional Policy Series No. 7., Brussels, 1978.
TABLE 10.National Economic Targets, 1977-80
1977 1978 1979 1980
Reduction in nos. out of work 5,000 20,000 25,000 30,000
Rate of inflation (%, end year) 10.75 7 7 5
% Increase in National Output 5 7 7 7
Borrowing as % of N.P. 11 13 10.5 8
Source: Regional Development Programme, 
(E.C. Brussels, 1978).
Ireland, 1977-80, p.18,
TABLE 11. Employment Targets 1978 <and Estimated Outturn
Sector Target Estimated Outturn
Agriculture -4,000 -5,000
Industry - 15,000 12,000
Manuf acturing 10,000 7,000
Building & Construction 5,000 5,000
Services 9,000 10,000
Total 20,000 17,000
Source: Programme for National Development, 1978- 
PRL. 7618 S.O. Dublin 1979.
81, p.12,
TABLE 12. Economic Targets, 1979-81
1979 1980 1981
Reduction in nos. out of work 25,000l 30,000 20,000
Rate of inflation 5 5 <5
Increase in national output 6.5 7 5
Exchequer borrowing requirement (as % of N.P.) 10.5 8 <8
Source: Programme for National Development, 1978-81, p.19.
"....  making better provision for infrastructural
development, and ensuring that economic advance is 
accompanied by social progress in areas such as 
education, health, housing and social security."
(p.11).
The main targets for the period are outlined in Table 10. These are 
based on an assumed growth rate of 7% per annum in G.N.P. to 1980, 
an achievement which past experience would seem to suggest is by no 
means certain.
For the first year of the Programme, the main objectives 
were as follows1:-
1. completion of a special job creation programme to provide
20,000 jobs;
2. a reduction in the numbers out of work of 20,000;
3. an increase in national output of 7%;
4. a rate of inflation at end-year of 7%;
5. an Exchequer borrowing requirement equal to 13% of G.N.P. 
These objectives were achieved virtually intact. The first target 
was well surpassed, with an estimated 22,700 jobs resulting from 
various job creation schemes. Table 11 shows the progress made 
towards achieving the second target, representing a substantial 
improvement on past performance. The major disappointment was in 
the curbing of inflation, which was one percentage point greater 
than the target, this being attributed almost entirely to higher 
than expected wage settlements.
In the light of the apparent successes in 1978, the targets
were revised upwards for the following three year period (Table 12) -
"The primary objective (being) to achieve the maxi­
mum employment increase." (Programme 1978-1981, p.19).
In many respects it is felt that this latest series of 
"National Development Programmes" suffers from a number of deficienc­
ies already discussed in the context of the earlier "Plans for 
Expansion". A rather cynical view would be to describe them as 
merely European bureaucratic necessities, and as a further indulgence 
in hit-or-miss target setting. This view is perhaps further support-
JWhite Paper "Programme for National Development, 1978-1981", 
Dublin 1979.
ed by the already mentioned act of disbanding the Department of 
Economic Planning and Development, the very Department with the 
statutory responsibility to co-ordinate the work of all other 
Departments or Bodies in the field of economic and social develop­
ment at both the national and regional level. Nevertheless, the 
fact that infrastructural and social development policies are given, 
superficially at least, articulation in a spatial framework, and are 
considered central to any programme for national economic develop­
ment, as expressed in these documents, marks, it is felt, a consider­
able advancement in planning in the Irish context. The production 
annually of these Programmes is also a factor of considerable import­
ance in that it necessitates constant monitoring of change, which 
may have the benefit of promoting better forecasting and more real­
istic policy objectives in the future. Indeed the very act of sett­
ing targets, even though they may not be achieved,gives some basis 
on which to measure success and may indirectly prompt improved per­
formance in the future.
The above sections have set out the development of national 
planning in Ireland. The fact that so much emphasis has been put on 
this aspect of planning perhaps reflects the highly centralised nat­
ure of government in the country. As will be seen from the following 
sections, this latter factor has also had a major bearing on the 
development of planning at the sub-national level.
3.2 Sub-National Planning
(a) 1963 et al.
Without doubt the most influential piece of legislation to 
date in the context of sub-national planning in Ireland has been the 
'Local Government (Planning and Development) Act, 1963'. This, along 
with the more recent 'Local Government Act, 1976', forms the legis­
lative framework for physical planning in the country. More import­
ant in the context of the present discussion are the developments in 
the field of regional planning which have taken place as a result of 
the 1963 Act.
Under the terms of the Act, the Minister for Local Government 
was given statutory responsibility for co-ordinating the policies of
the local authorities contained in the development plans which they 
are obliged to produce. A number of major initiatives have come 
about in consequence of this function. Two reports commissioned by 
the Minister - the Lichfield Report for the Limerick, Shannon, Ennis 
area, and the Myles Wright Report on the Dublin Region - necessitated 
the delineation of areas for planning purposes which were larger than 
the existing County units. A third - the Buchanan Report - consid­
ered a spatial framework for a national growth strategy. The nine 
planning regions (Fig. 1) delimited in 1969, were a direct spin-off 
from these earlier Reports.
The first regional development organisation - in the Mid- 
West Physical Planning Region - was an informal group, consisting of 
representatives from the various local authorities and the Shannon 
Free Airport Development Company, which had been convened in connect­
ion with the above mentioned Lichfield Study. Its success led to a 
decision to form similar bodies in the remaining planning regions, 
announced in the Government regional policy statement in May 1969.
A further important development was the founding by the 
Minister for Local Government of a Physical Planning and Construction 
Research Agency - An Foras Forbartha - to assist him in carrying out 
his planning co-ordination role by undertaking survey and other 
general research work as directed.
All these measures would seem to indicate a degree of commit­
ment to sub-national planning at the regional level, but as will be 
seen, the reality has been somewhat less than praiseworthy. If any­
thing, the evidence would seem to suggest that central control of 
power and resources has increased rather than diminished over recent 
years, with regional planning becoming increasingly the preserve of 
Dublin based bureaucrats.
(b) Administrative Structure for Regional Development
There are perhaps four different administative structures 
involved in the planning process:-
I The local authorities - 27 county councils, 4 county borough 
corporations, 7 borough corporations and 49 urban district 
councils - whose main concern is with physical planning, and
the provision of infrastructural, environmental and other 
local services.
II Regional bodies - the Regional Development Organisations 
(see section (c) below).
III Regional bodies dealing with specific sub-national geographic 
areas - these include Gaeltarra Eireann, a body with respons­
ibility for industrial development in the Gaeltacht areas of 
the country, and thus having an important influence on wider 
issues of physical and social planning in these areas and 
also the Shannon Free Airport Development Company (S.F.A.D.Co.) 
set up in 1959 to promote the increased use of the airport for 
industrial purposes, and to co-ordinate tourist development in
the surrounding regions. Successful attraction of industry in
the 1960's led to an extension of S.F.A.D.Co.1 s function to 
include the industrial development of the whole Mid-West region
IV Central departments or bodies operating on a regional basis -
these include State sponsored bodies such as the Industrial 
Development Authority. However, as Whelan notes (1976, p.291), 
with these bodies -
"....  very often real devolution of authority does
not exist. Decisions are still taken by the central 
body with no more than a dispersal of staff or a 
local presence existing at sub-national levels."
This criticism could almost equally apply to the entire local 
government system, which is constantly overshadowed, and often 
over-ruled by higher authority. Keating (1976, p.331) has 
indicated the problems faced by many local authorities due to 
severe limitations imposed by government -
"Irish government arrangements are noted in the 
European scene for the degree of power and control 
centred in national government, and in particular 
for the control and restrictions imposed on the 
Local Government system. Many local authorities 
suffer from a remoteness from Central Government 
not alone in the geographic sense but also because 
of statutory limitations as to functions coupled 
with inadequacy of resources."
The power of the local authorities has been further eroded by the 
abolition of rates, a measure welcomed by the ratepayers, but which 
has deprived the local authorities of a major independent source of 
revenue. Their limited autonomy is further threatened by the oper­
ations of State sponsored bodies like the I.D.A. whose own industrial 
development plans can seriously undermine the statutory development 
plans of the local authorities, by fostering development which is in­
compatible with the proposed land use zoning.1
This conflict of interests is also an inevitable result of 
the multiplicity of bodies involved in all aspects of regional devel­
opment. Brennan (1976, pp.8-9) lists 200 bodies involved in the pro­
cess of regional development, while Barrington (1975) suggests the 
possibility of 87 different bodies operating in a single village 
totally unaware of each others existence. If nothing else, these 
figures highlight the need for a restructuring of the present admin­
istrative mess to enable proper co-ordinated planning to be carried 
out at the regional level, and to ensure that (a) there is no dupli­
cation of function, (b) the meagre existing resources be more effic­
iently used, and (c) the planning function be in the hands of a body 
which is more readily accessible and answerable to the public than at 
present, and more in touch with actual planning problems rather than 
administrative whims.
The Devlin Report,2 as long ago as 1969 argued that - 
"The weaknesses (of local government) are the extent of 
the central controls that hedge it in, and the lack of 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities to enable it 
to play a truly developmental part in the system of 
Irish government, and the lack also of a single central 
authority concerned with these problems."
As yet these weaknesses have not been rectified, but the basis for 
change does, it is felt, already exist in the guise of the Regional 
Development Organisations, as will be seen in the following section.
xAn example of this is the I.D.A.'s decision to develop land for 
industrial use outside of the town of Carrick-on-Shannon in the 
North-West Region, with a total disregard for the industrial and 
residential land-use zoning in the County Development Plan.
2Report of the Public Services Organisation Review Group, 1966-'69 
(see Brennan, 1976, esp. pp.18-21).
(c) The Regional Development Organisations
The Regional Development Organisations (R.D.O.'s) grew out of 
the successful experience of the regional planning co-ordinating 
committee operating in the Limerick area in connection with the 
Lichfield study already referred to. It should be noted, however, 
that much of the success in the Mid-West region resulted not simply 
from the existence of such a committee, but from the participation 
within it of S.F.A.D.Co. with the drive and energy, and more import­
antly, the resources of manpower and finance, and executive powers to 
ensure that proposals were carried out on the ground as well as on 
the drawing-board. In contrast, the R.D.O.'s which emerged-later, 
like the Economic Planning and Development Councils in England, while 
able to formulate planning policy on a regional basis, have lacked 
the power and resources to implement their proposals.
A Government statement in May 1969 announced the setting up 
of R.D.O.'s in all the planning regions, their main function being -
"....  to co-ordinate the programme for regional
development in each region. The purpose of the 
programme will be, principally, to identify the 
potential in each area, including the factors 
which make for economic expansion (such as growth 
centres) and the factors which impede expansion."
However, the important proviso attached was that -
"It is not intended that the regional groups will 
assume any executive functions."
The regional reports referred to above were all completed, and formed 
the basis for the Statement on Regional Policy in May 1972. On the
R.D.O.'s, it read -
"The Government considers that the Regional 
Development Organisations established in the 
regions are performing a useful role which should 
be developed further and that they should accord­
ingly continue to receive assistance and support.
This does not imply any departure from the intent­
ion to preserve the county as the basic local
government unit."
Further support for the county rather than a regional authority as
the main unit of local government was given in the White Paper on 
Local Government Reorganisation (1971). Thus the commitment to 
regional planning must be doubted.
Barrington, in an Addendum to the "Devlin Report" has argued
that -
"....  the history of local government at county level
and the experience of S.F.A.D.Co. showed that the 
effective devolution of discretion was meaningless 
unless the authority to which the discretion was 
devolved was given real authority and funds, and that 
it was a clearly executive authority, not a consult­
ative or ornamental one."
Surely, then, if the Government sees the need to further develop the 
role of the R.D.O.'s this must include provision of increased resources 
and statutory recognition, giving them the power to act as real plann­
ing agencies rather than simply as advisory bodies -
"If R.D.O.'s are to motivate statutory bodies to imple­
ment development plans incorporating individual 
objectives of the strategy, to achieve effective co­
ordination of investment programmes at regional level 
and to make the regions' claim for a fair share of 
resources from Central Government, then they must 
have some measure of delegated authority and some say 
in the allocation of resources." (Cullinane, 1976, 
p.329).
The R.D.O.'s themselves argued the need for statutory recognition in a 
submission to the Minister for Local Government in 1974. This, they 
claimed, would promote a greater understanding and acceptance of the 
R.D.O.'s as an important agent for regional development, and would
overcome the problems of lack of co-operation, since it would "....
enhance their status and credibility in dealing with Statutory Bodies.
In the White Paper on Local Government Reorganisation (1971) 
it was argued that executive regional authorities operating between 
existing central and local authorities would not be feasible due to 
the small size of the country (population and area). This arguement 
is quite acceptable, in that it would avoid duplication of function 
and increased bureaucracy, but less acceptable is the inferred central
ist logic that the status quo is preferable to reorganisation into 
larger local units. One model which could perhaps be adopted is that 
of the "general purpose authorities"1 in Scotland, where, although 
District level authorities still exist, the planning function is at a 
regional level, due to the dispersed settlement patterns in these 
regions. There are indeed strong parallels between the problems and 
needs of these regions, and those of all the regions in Ireland, with 
the exception, perhaps of the East, which would suggest that similar 
policies might also be considered appropriate.
In a study of 'Institutional Arrangements for Regional 
Economic Development1 (N.E.S.C. Report No. 22, 1976) Brennan suggests 
that -
"Regional development requires ....  the preparation
of integrated strategies or plans for overall devel­
opment and an executive agency or agencies to imple­
ment these strategies. In this way various components 
in the development process can be harnessed to produce 
positive development rather than merely react passively 
to events as they occur or are generated by other 
agencies." (p.14).
He pointed to a number of weaknesses which hampered regional develop­
ment, including the lack of any comprehensive regional policy and of 
a set of integrated regional plans, which he claimed, were not poss­
ible to produce due to the absence of a national programme or plan.
On the contrary, however, a framework does exist, both through the 
National/Regional Development Programmes submitted to the European 
Commission, and through the Regional Industrial Plans of the I.D.A.. 
The fact that so much importance is attached to the latter, is perhaps 
an indication of the planning vacuum which exists at the regional 
level, and underlines the existing need for some form of regional 
development agency.
It is therefore suggested that until the R.D.O.'s, or some 
similar regional agencies are given statutory powers to co-ordinate 
development, the problems of mismatch of infrastructural and other 
investment needs at the regional level will persist. Unless change
defers to the Highland, Borders and Dumfries and Galloway Regions.
occurs regional development will continue to be no more than indust­
rial development programming, divorced from all other aspects of 
planning, including social planning. It is doubtful, however, 
whether both the will and commitment can be found at central level 
to agree to any effective diminution of Central Authority power. In 
the absence of such a move, some alternative to the present planning
administration must be sought. It has been suggested that "....  the
Regional Industrial Plans of the I.D.A. might form the focal point 
for integrated planning for each region." (Brennan, 1976, p.34). It 
is appropriate, therefore, to now turn attention to the I.D.A.. The 
following chapter looks at the work of the Authority in industrial 
development at the national level, and also at the extent to which it 
has succeeded at the regional level in generating economic and 
particularly industrial employment growth, and in fostering the policy 
of regional 'equalisation'.
\
CHAPTER 4
INDUSTRIAL GROWTH AND THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
4.1 Introduction
Any discussion of the industrial progress which has been made 
in Ireland since 1950 would be inadequate without due recognition 
being given to the major contributory role played by the Industrial 
Development Authority (I.D.A.), the driving force behind both 
'domestic' industry development and the growth of foreign exporting 
investment which has transformed the industrial sector of the economy
Set up as an autonomous body by the 'Industrial Development 
Act, 1950', its main functions were largely promotional and advisory. 
Its remit included -
"i. to initiate proposals and schemes for submission 
to the Minister (for Industry and Commerce) for 
the creation and development of Irish industries, 
iii-iv. to advise the Minister on steps necessary 
and desirable for establishing new industries 
and for the expansion and modernisation of exist­
ing concerns,
v. to give on request advice and guidance to persons 
contemplating starting new industries or expand­
ing existing ones."1
Its responsibilities were considerably extended under the 
1969 Industrial Development Act, which merged the I.D.A. as it was 
then constituted with An Foras Tionscal, the body which until then 
had been responsible for developing industrial estates, and for 
administering adaptation and new industry grants. The 'new' I.D.A. 
is a corporate body existing wholly outwith the Civil Service. Its 
nine members are appointed by the Minister for Industry and Commerce 
with the consent of the Minister for Finance. The Authority is 
financed each year by an Exchequer grant agreed upon by both these 
Ministers as being adequate for the discharge of all obligations and
1full remit contained in 'Industrial Development Authority Act, 1950' 
section 3.
liabilities incurred under the Act, but there appears to be few res­
trictions on how this money should actually be spent, so long as it 
is being used to serve the remit laid down by the Act.
Although it has nine regional offices throughout Ireland, the 
Authority is still a highly centralised body, with decision-making 
being chiefly the preserve of its Dublin headquarters. Its executive 
powers are considerable, and its influence is far-reaching, over most 
aspects of development in Ireland today. Indeed much concern has been 
expressed by a number of observers1 at its degree of autonomy, and 
particularly at its apparent freedom to act without many of the operat 
ing restrictions imposed on local authorities and other similar bodies 
Nevertheless, few will deny that this has perhaps been one of the main 
reasons for its successes to date. It also makes it a considerably 
different body from industrial promotion and development agencies 
operating in other countries, such as the Scottish Development Agency, 
which although having similar remits, do not have the same powers to 
act. The extent, therefore, to which the I.D.A. has contributed to 
the industrial and regional development of Ireland, should be of con­
siderable interest to other countries pursuing similar developmental 
policies.
The ensuing discussion will look at the work of the I.D.A., 
both in promoting industrial employment growth, and in fostering 
regional development. An assessment will also be made of the extent 
to which it has been successful in pursuing both these aims.
4.2 The Role and Policy Objectives of the I.D.A.
The Industrial Development Act, 1969, gave the I.D.A. consid­
erably wider scope for action in the field of industrial expansion 
than had been the case beforehand. In addition to its remit set out 
in the 1950 I.D.A. Act, it was given the following functions:-
1. to act under the Minister (Industry and Commerce) as a body 
having national responsibility for the furtherance of indust­
rial development;
2. to provide and administer such grants and other financial
Numerous personal interviews with Academics, Economic Researchers 
and Civil Servants in Ireland, 1979.
facilities for industry as it may be authorised by the 
Oireachtas to provide and administer;
3. to develop, construct, maintain and administer industrial 
estates and factory buildings (other than at Shannon Customs 
Free Airport), together with the associated facilities of 
such estates and buildings;
4. to provide and arrange, where the Authority considers it 
necessary, housing for employees in industry;
5. to foster the national objective of regional industrial 
development. (1969 Act No. 32, para. 11.)
This last designated function is undoubtedly the most important, 
particularly when it is realised that industrial development is held 
to be the key to the future prosperity of the country, thus making 
the I.D.A. the principle agent of both national and regional devel­
opment policy.
In 1972 the Managing Director outlined the task of the 
Authority as being -
"..... to promote the rapid build-up of the industrial
sector by providing information, guidance and encour­
agement, and financial inducements and assistance to 
existing Irish and to overseas manufacturing firms 
willing to invest in Ireland." (Killeen, 1972, p.11). 
However, in the Authority's 'Regional Industrial Development Plans, 
1973-'77',1 published in the same year, recognition was given to the 
wider responsibilities of the I.D.A.,within its regional development 
remit, to take note of -
"....  objectives deriving from wider demographic,
social and economic goals which are not within the 
direct and exclusive field of responsibility of 
the I.D.A., but which nevertheless form part of 
the framework within which I.D.A. activities are 
carried out." (1973 Plan).
1For the remaining discussion, the I.D.A.'s Regional Industrial 
Development Plans, 1973-'77, 1977-'80, and 1978-'82 will be referred 
to as the 1973, 1977 and 1978 Plans respectively, unless otherwise 
stated.
It is indeed imperative for the achievement of the regional develop­
ment goal that social objectives should not be lost site of in the 
desire for economic advancement. To this end a series of social and 
community objectives were incorporated into the Authority's industrial 
strategy as outlined in the 1973 Plan. These included -
(a) to help maintain and improve the existing pattern of community 
settlements.
(b) to aim at provision of employment within a travel-to-work time 
of not more than thirty minutes.
(c) to spur development in the smaller centres by encouraging the 
location of small industrial units in them.
(d) to contribute to the development of selected towns as growth 
centres ....
(e) to contribute to the development in each region of a number 
of centres providing a wide range of higher order social, 
shopping, commercial, sporting and cultural facilities.
(f) to encourage, where appropriate, the "clustering" of geograph­
ically and functionally related towns to form a stronger base 
for industrial and social development. (1973 Plan, Pt. I,
p.40.)
Closer scrutiny would, however, appear to reveal certain con­
tradictions within the Plan. It is stated, for example, that - 
"In the attraction of the bulk of the new manufacturing 
jobs required, the I.D.A. subscribes to the view that
the larger centres ....  will have a major role to play
(the aim being) to foster their emergence as develop­
ment centres with skilled labour pools, industrial 
services, good infrastructural facilities and social 
and cultural amenities so that in time they can be 
brought to the stage of self-sustaining growth." (1973 
Plan, Pt. I, p.48).
This surely is tantamount to support for a growth centre policy, which 
would hardly be compatible with the expressed social objective of 
overall, unbalanced regional development. Indeed, how would it be 
possible to pursue such a policy without adversely affecting the devel-
ment prospects of the very numerous smaller towns and villages? Some 
recognition was given to possible policy conflicts in a suggestion 
that -
"....  achieving certain employment targets in some
peripheral areas within a given national resource 
allocation for employment creation may result in 
reduced job creation numbers at the national level."
(1973 Plan, Pt. I, p.38).
Given such a choice, is it realistic to think that a body such as the 
I.D.A., whose main task as outlined earlier by its Managing Director 
is to promote rapid industrialisation, is likely to opt for anything 
but the optimum job creating strategy?
This question is perhaps answered by the fact that in the 1978 
Plan, published after a period of relative stagnation in terms of 
industrial employment growth, there is scant reference to social 
objectives of policy. The role of the I.D.A. is set out purely in 
terms of industrial development -
"..... to encourage and assist new investment in
manufacturing in order to create additional employ­
ment, to encourage enterprise and innovation in 
industry and to help existing industry faced with 
pressures from free trade and technological change 
to maintain its workforce." (1978 Plan, p.25).
This statement in fact suggests a more subtle change of policy, with 
greater emphasis than before being directed towards job preservation 
and restructuring in the manufacturing sector. This inevitably means 
stronger policy initiatives favouring the older industrialised areas, 
particularly in the East and North East Regions. What then for the 
smaller Underindustrialised centres?
The 1973 Plan had as a basic locational strategy -
"....  aiding the gradual stemming of population
decline in areas now suffering from excessive migrat­
ion through the encouragement of small scale industry 
in the smaller population centres, thereby creating 
new local industrial bases and establishing conditions 
conducive to growth." (1973 Plan, Pt. I, p.51).
Such a strategy is well favoured as it tends to minimise the level of 
'social disruption' caused by new industrial development in predomin­
antly rural areas. A number of glaring examples can, however, be 
pointed to of developments which have been supported by the I.D.A., 
but which do not appear to be in accord with the above sentiments.
One such example is the Asahi synthetic fibre plant developed at 
Killala, Co. Mayo, ostensibly attracted to the area by the substantial 
water resources available. It employs a workforce of over a thousand, 
in an area of very sparse population, and with no previous industrial 
history. It has been severely criticised on a number of accounts, 
including the following - (a) the scale of the development is unsuited 
to the area on environmental and social grounds, (b) it overwhelms the 
local labour market, making the area too highly dependent on a single 
employer, necessitating also considerable incommuting, and through 
raising wage expections, threatens the existence of other local sources 
of employment, and (c) it introduces a culture and a new workforce 
which are totally alien to the traditional lifestyle of the area, and 
in consequence militates against the national objective of cultural 
preservation and enhancement. In addition, it can be assumed that 
such a large scale project in such an isolated location would require 
substantial investment to be made in local infrastructure, thus marked­
ly increasing the cost per job created, paid for by the public purse.
The above criticisms were rejected out of hand by a senior 
I.D.A. official,1 answering to the effect that (sic) -
"We have heard these arguements before concerning this 
type of development. Our task is to provide jobs, and 
in the case of Asahi we have done so on a large scale 
where none were provided before. Why criticise us for 
having done our job properly?"
This rather dismissive tone seems to confirm the widely held view that 
the prevalent attitude amongst officials of the Authority is that 
'jobs come first, and any adverse consequences are someone elses res­
ponsibility' .
Unquestionably the I.D.A. has been successful in the task to 
which it is best suited - that of creating jobs, but success in one
1Personal interview, November 1979.
area does not necessarily lead to success in others. In the absence 
of statutory regional planning agencies the I.D.A. has in essence, 
assumed the role of executor of regional development policy.
Certainly the Authority's work in the sphere of industry has import­
ant development implications for other areas of regional policy, but 
it should not necessarily follow that, under present legislation at 
least, the I.D.A. is the body best suited to such a co-ordinating 
role. If this is to be the case, then it is suggested that the 
I.D.A.'s remit, particularly as it relates to regional policy object­
ives, should be more clearly defined. If more than just lip-service 
is to be paid to the goal of broad-based regional development, then 
there is a need for more stringent guidlines to be set regarding such 
issues as deciding priorities between suiting employment by type and 
location, and creating the maximum number of jobs for a given level 
of grant. At present there appears to be far too great a degree of 
freedom in which the Authority can operate according to its own 
objective criteria, and not enough control exerted by politicians and 
others to ensure that national objectives for regional development 
are adhered to.
4.3 The Organisational Structure of the I.D.A.
The main organisational structure of the I.D.A. is outlined in 
brief in Fig. 3. At the bottom level are a considerable number of 
different Divisions, dealing with the various areas of concern of the 
Authority's operations. Amongst these, the three 'Industries 
Divisions', with responsibilities in the field of industrial promotion 
and development, divided largely by manufacturing sector and by product 
type. In addition, there are Divisions dealing specifically with Heavy 
and with Small Industries. An Industrial Services Division also exists, 
whose chief concern lies with domestic industries, particularly in 
connection with the 'Enterprise Development' and 'Joint Venture' 
schemes, both promoting indigenous industrial growth (see below). It 
also provides a further back-up service through its Rescue and 
Restructuring package and by supporting Research and Development (R.&D.). 
Other important sections include Planning and Development, responsible 
for national and regional industrial planning, and the actual physical 
planning of development, Grants Administration and the Building Operat-
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ions Division, charged with land acquisition and factory building. 
Perhaps more important than these is the Regions and Projects Services 
Division, which carries out project identification, and also includes 
the I.D.A.'s Industrial Intelligence Section. It is through the twin 
processes of identifying domestic supply shortfalls and product areas 
and firms with likely future investment prospects that the I.D.A. is 
able to formulate and implement its future sectoral investment strategy.
On top of the already outlined structure is the Authority's 
overall administration, answerable to the Managing Director, but the 
investment decisions relating specifically to the Authority's industry 
programme are taken by the Board with advice from one or other of five 
consultative committees made up of representatives from the I.D.A. 
itself and other interested parties, including amongst others, the 
Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the Confederation of Irish Industry, 
the Industrial Credit Company, and Coras Trachtala (C.T.T. - the 
National Export Promotions Body). Each of these makes recommendations 
to the Board concerning their various fields of interest - Small 
Industry, Re-Equipment, Domestic Industry, R.&D., and Enterprise 
Development - and decides upon individual grant applications. Further 
scope for co-ordination and co-operation is provided by virtue of the 
I.D.A. being represented on the Boards and Committees of most other 
bodies whose work may have some bearing on the successful achievement 
of I.D.A. policy goals.
At the regional level the I.D.A. works closely with other 
bodies, being represented on the R.D.O.'s and on the Country Develop­
ment Teams, but verbal evidence suggests that liaison with most local 
authorities has been largely by way of 'consultation by consent', 
rather than true co-operation. The actual regional presence of the
I.D.A. is fairly nominal, the role of the regional offices being merely 
to advise existing and potential investors on the availability of I.D.A. 
services, and to provide information pertaining to land, labour, train­
ing and infrastructure.
The final organisational tier is the network of sixteen promot­
ional offices dispersed throughout North America and Europe and also 
including Japan and Australia. With 80 full-time overseas staff this 
is a fairly comprehensive network, particularly when compared with that
of near neighbours, and strong rivals, the S.D.A., with only 2 full­
time promotional staff in North America. It is impossible, however, 
to quantify the benefits which may arise from having overseas offices.
As one I.D.A. official put it1 -
They are probably most valuable as a shop-window, 
since it is most unlikely that many distant over­
seas firms would consider an Irish location, and
apply to Dublin without having gone through their
'local' I.D.A. office...... It is always better
to have personal contact than mere correspondence.
It is interesting to note, however, the closure of the Brussels office, 
all its staff having been transferred back to Dublin, from where, it is 
felt the I.D.A.'s interests in the E.E.C. can be equally well served.
Nevertheless, while a highly efficient and extremely well 
organised administrative back-up is an essential ingredient to any 
successful promotional campaign, it would not of itself be sufficient 
to attract potential investors without the addition of a fairly com­
prehensive incentive package. It would be fair to say that the I.D.A.'s 
is more comprehensive than most!
4.4 The Incentive Package
Recent I.D.A. publicity announces Ireland as "the most profit­
able location in the European Community", in terms of return on 
industrial investment. This is supported by evidence from the U.S. 
Department of Commerce of returns on investment earned by U.S. affil­
iates in Ireland being invariably in excess of the average return for
U.S. investment in Europe as a whole. McAleese (1977, p.52) also 
highlights the fact that even during the recession years, returns of 
25% on the book value of net assets exceeded that for U.S. investment 
in most other European countries by a considerable margin. In the 
period 1974-'77, the average annual return on U.S. manufacturing invest­
ment in Ireland was 28.5%, and 12.8% for the E.E.C. as a whole (Ambrose, 
1978, p.3). These large profit margins are attributable chiefly to the 
generous incentive package provided by the I.D.A. which is acknowledged 
to be one of, if not the most lucrative available in Europe.
Jpersonal interview.
Arguably the most attractive incentive which has been avail­
able to date is that of a fifteen year tax holiday on export profits, 
with a possibility of relief at a reducing annual rate for a further 
five years. Introduced in 1958, to promote export-led expansion of 
the industrial sector in Ireland it has been particularly attractive 
to foreign investors due to the opportunities offered to benefit from 
transfer-pricing. For reasons which will be explained in Chapter 5, 
this incentive will no longer be available after end-December 1980. 
Those firms at present benefitting from this incentive, and those 
which establish in Ireland before that date, may continue with this 
incentive until 1990, or alternatively, they may opt for its replace­
ment - a 10% rate of Corporation Tax applying both to firms exporting 
or serving the domestic market - if they consider the latter to be 
more lucrative. In addition to the above, there is no restriction on 
the repatriation of profits, which is further facilitated by agreements 
reached with the governments of the major investing nations for the 
avoidance or mitigation of double taxation. To encourage reinvestment 
by firms in Ireland, however, liability for Capital Gains Tax - at the 
rate of 30% - may be deferred if the capital is reinvested, until such 
time as the reinvestment programme ceases.
Generous depreciation allowances are also available, to further 
reduce the tax liabilities of individual firms. Annual allowances of 
up to 25% are permissible for plant and machinery, or, if the manufact­
urer prefers, 100% of expenditure on these items may be written off 
against tax in the first year. As an incentive to firms to locate in 
the Development Areas (D.A.'s) an extra allowance of 20% on plant and 
machinery could be claimed, giving a total possible allowance of 120%. 
This too is an incentive which will no longer be available to future 
investors (see Chapter 5).
More tangible incentives are those provided by way of non­
repayable cash grants towards fixed asset investment costs. These are 
available for new industry investment, up to a maximum of 60% in the 
D.A.1s and 45% in the Non-Development Areas (N.D.A.'s). It should be 
noted that at 60%, Ireland offers the highest nominal rate of grant in 
the E.E.C. (Allen, 1977, p.17). This is, however, a legal maximum, 
the administrative maximum being about 10% less, and the average level 
of award being lower still. Allan (1977, p.130) has shown the average
nominal value of award to be 27.0% in the D.A.'s and 21.0% in the 
N.D.A.'s, but in effective value terms these rates reduce to 18.7% 
and 14.6% respectively, thus indicating in reality a watering-down of 
the regional component of the grant system. There is no automatic 
entitlement to the maximum level of grant. Rather the award is agreed 
on a trade-off basis, with the following factors considered:-
1. location of project
2. level of value added
3. ability of project to provide jobs quickly
4. skill content in jobs
5. long term growth potential
6. significance of the technology of projects in facilitating
expansion of desirable sectors
7. projects where R.&D. or marketing functions will be established 
in Ireland
8. projects using native natural resources
9. projects with spin-off possibilities to existing firms.
To encourage both a broadening of the industrial base, and also 
increased specialisation and higher productivity in particular product 
areas, non-repayable cash grants are available for re-equipment and 
modernisation, at the rate of 35% in the D.A.'s and 25% elsewhere.
These are normally available up to a limit of £1.25m, but this may be 
exceeded with Ministerial approval, provided that the percentage limits 
are adhered to. Facilities for R.&D. may also be assisted at the above 
percentage rates, and in addition, specific R.&D. projects which may be 
'in-house' or carried out at the I.D.A.'s Research Park at Naas, are 
eligible for grants of up to 50% or £50,000, whichever be the lower 
figure.
Other inducements to potential investors include advance and 
purpose-built factories available throughout the country. To further 
the factory building programme the I.D.A. has a land-bank, which in 
1979 consisted of almost 4,000 acres, at 62 different locations. Key 
worker housing may also be provided, in conjunction with the National 
Building Agency. 100% grants for labour training are also available, 
and the Authority provides a comprehensive after-care and advisory 
service for firms in their initial years of production. Largely to
encourage growth of domestic enterprises, there are (a) the Small 
Industries Programme, with grants at the same rate as those for 'new 
industry', up to a maximum of £300,000 for firms employing up to 50 
people, (b) the Joint Venture Programme, to encourage expansion 
through partnerships usually between foreign and Irish firms - up to 
100% of the travel costs are awarded to enable managerial staff to 
visit potential partners, and (c) the Enterprise Development Programme, 
aimed at encouraging potential "first-time entrepreneurs", with good 
ideas but lacking in investment capital, to set up in production, with 
equity finance provided by the I.D.A..
This latter programme, started in 1978, marks a significant 
change for the I.D.A. which has in the past shown a certain reluctance 
to involve itself in providing working capital. Although special 
arrangements have been made with the banks to provide working capital 
loans of up to £25,000 for a maximum five year period, this applies 
only to the Small Industries Programme. In general, loans for perman­
ent working capital may be made available by the Industrial Credit 
Company, but not by the I.D.A. itself. For certain types of manufact­
uring concerns the I.D.A. may provide interest subsidies and give loan 
guarantees on the interest due on borrowed finance for fixed assets, 
and working capital. Under the 1969 Industrial Development Act is is 
also empowered to take equity participation where it feels this to be 
possible and appropriate. It seems ironic, however, in view of the 
fact that risk/working capital forms such a large part of project costs, 
and often presents the greatest stumbling-block to industrial develop­
ment and expansion, particularly for the smaller domestic firm, that 
the I.D.A. should not show a greater involvement in this area of invest­
ment finance. On the question of equiry finance one I.D.A. official1 
suggested that the Authority did not favour this type of aid since it 
could not adequately exercise direct control over its use by individual 
firms. When it was provided, he outlined a preference for 'restricted' 
rather than 'heavy' equity, and that to be available on a 'buy-back' 
basis.
If the prognosis is correct that the level of footloose foreign 
investment will dramatically decrease in the not too distant future,
1personal interview.
then it may be that Ireland will have to depend much more than it has 
in the past for new employment to be generated by the indigenous manu­
facturing sector. Although a general indication of such a strategy is 
given in the I.D.A.'s 1978 Plan, which has as a central target the 
creation of more than half of the new jobs in 1978-'82 by domestic 
sources, this figure is in itself misleading, since it includes as 
'domestic' all those foreign owned firms established in Ireland before 
the initial Plan period began. Thus there is not as yet a sufficient 
commitment to lessen the country's dependence on overseas investment.
The initial success of the Enterprise Development Programme - 22 pro­
jects approved in the first year, with a job potential of 900, and 14 
actually in production at end-1978 - may be an indication of the un­
tapped potential for indigenous growth, which, until credit barriers 
had been overcome, through loan guarantees and such-like from the I.D.A. 
could not be realised.
A number of other areas of I.D.A. incentive policy have also 
come in for criticism. Schaffer (1979, p.240) points out that while 
the incentives offered to attract foreign firms since 1958 attracted 
more industrial investment, this was accompanied by a lower rate of 
job creation. He further suggests that the institutions themselves, 
including the I.D.A. have encouraged foreign investment to be capital 
intensive, and therefore, labour-displacing. Kennedy and Foley (1978, 
pp.110-111) argue that, in that the incentive scheme is geared to give 
maximum benefit to profit making exporters it has been poorly adapted 
to the needs of domestic industry which needed venture capital first 
before it could benefit through profit -
"Most of the successful entrepreneurs received no help 
whatsoever in making the vital first move from employee 
to employer. State grants, premises, loans were out of 
reach until they had proved themselves."1
While, as has been mentioned above, some moves have been made to over­
come the initial financial barrier for domestic firms, in general the 
present range of incentives still favours capital intensive invest­
ment. Of particular note is the Re-Equipment Grant Scheme. The larg­
est single grant approved to date under this scheme has been one of
almost £5m to Arthur Guinness and Sons Ltd. in Dublin. A grant of
1Rotherby, B., "Men of Enterprise", p.24. Institute for Industrial 
Research and Standards, Dublin 1977.
almost £1.5m has also been approved for the Carrolls1 cigarette com­
pany in Dundalk. Both of these are firms which would hardly have gone 
out of production without these grants - grants which assisted ration­
alisation and hence job-displacement programmes, were counter product­
ive in terms of industrial employment growth, and could thus be con­
strued as a misuse of public resources. In such cases, and also in
cases where modernisation is essential to the future of the firm there
is perhaps significant scope for an extension of equity participation 
by the I.D.A., which would not only provide the necessary finance for 
the firms involved, but would also give the likelihood of a positive 
return to the Exchequer.2
The above presents a brief outline of the types of incentives 
made available by the I.D.A., and their suitability to the needs of 
different industrial concerns. Attention will now turn to the success 
or otherwise of the I.D.A., aided by its incentive package, in creat­
ing employment particularly since 1960.
4.5 The Development of New Industry
4.5.1 Introduction. The New Industries (N.I.) Programme is the
most important of the I.D.A.'s areas of concern, as measured both in 
terns of assistance given (grants) and the absolute numbers of jobs 
created. In 1961-'71, N.I. provided 33,736 out of a net increase of 
34,197 manufacturing jobs (O'Farrell, 1975, p.l), and by 1973, with 
58,218 jobs, it provided 29% of manufacturing employment in Ireland 
(McAleese, 1977, p.16).
Added to its impact on employment, N.I. has contributed greatly 
to the restructuring of the industrial sector, and to raising export 
levels. Its share of gross output, at 30.5% in 1973 was consistent 
with its share of employment, but it has consistently performed dis­
proportionately better than the rest of industry in terms of its con­
tribution to manufacturing exports, accounting for 62.1% of manufact­
ured product exports in 1973. In its ratio of exports to gross output 
there is a quite startling contrast between N.I. - 72.4%, and the
1I.D.A. Annual Report, 1978.
2All shares must be in the name of the Minister for Industry and 
Commerce, therefore returns would not go directly to the I.D.A.
'rest' - 18.6% (Table 13). The contrasts by individual sectors are 
even greater, but as can be seen from the table, even within the N.I. 
group there are significant differences between those firms of foreign 
and Irish origin. With only one exception - structural clay and 
cement - new foreign firms have a higher export ratio than their Irish
TABLE 13.Ratio of Exports to Gross Output in Irish 
and Overseas Enterprise, 1973____________
Sector
New
Irish
Industry (N. 
Overseas
I.)
Total Other
1. Food 60.3 80.3 65.4 25.0
2. Drink and Tobacco 85.7 97.6 97.9 11.7
3. Textiles 54.0 94.6 75.6 32.7
4. Clothing and Footwear 34.7 91.9 61.3 9.9
5. Wood and Furniture 20.8 38.1 28.4 9.6
6. Paper and Printing 30.4 66.7 52.9 11.9
7. Chemicals 40.0 91.8 90.5 20.1
8. Structural Clay/Cement/Glass 60.0 46.9 52.6 10.1
9. Metals and Engineering 33.6 84.6 70.9 3.6
10. Other manufacturing 52.8 90.1 85.8 23.1
Total 54.4 87.6 72.4 18.6
Source: McAleese, D. 'A Profile of Grant-Aided Industry in
Ireland', p.30, (I.D.A., Dublin 1977).
counterparts. These figures illustrate the undoubted success of the 
Government's policy of promoting export-led industrial growth, and 
the attraction of Ireland as a base for exporting industries. The 
higher ratios exhibited by foreign as opposed to Irish N.I. is in 
part explained by the tendency for a large proportion of their trade 
to be with overseas affiliates - 85% of new U.S. concerns trade with 
affiliates, accounting for 77% of their exports (McAleese, 1977, 
p.37) - while the lower ratio for Irish firms suggests, perhaps, a 
lack of expertise in marketing abroad, and to an extent highlights 
the disadvantage of not having an established network of overseas 
contacts.
The tendency for foreign firms to shun the domestic market may 
be a reflection of the incentives offered, which make this area less 
lucrative than elsewhere. McAleese, however, indicates that home 
sales increase as a proportion of total sales the longer the foreign 
enterprise is established in Ireland. The imminent change in the 
incentives offered, with E.P.T.R. being replaced by a very nominal 
rate of corporation tax, may in fact encourage these firms to direct 
greater attention to the 'home' market, to the detriment of some dom­
estic firms. A further ominous point to note is that in almost every 
industrial sector identified in the I.D.A.'s 1978 Plan for major 
future growth, including chemicals, mechanical engineering and elec­
tronics, foreign investment has been dominant in recent years. In 
1961-'73, N.I. share of textiles investment was 75%, largely accounted 
for by foreign concerns. Since then major new investments from over­
seas have included those by Asahi, Courtaulds and Burlington Indus­
tries, increasing foreign dominance in this sector. This point will 
be considered again later, but suffice it to dwell on the fact that 
without the scale of foreign N.I. investment which has been attracted 
to date, Ireland's 'economic miracle' would have been unthinkable.
4.5.2 Origin and location of new overseas industries. At 1st 
January 1979, 654 overseas firms had interests in 641 operating indus­
trial concerns in Ireland.1 The majority, by nationality were of U.S. 
origin - 215, followed by the U.K. - 176, and Germany - 99. Also sig­
nificant in numerical terms were Dutch - 37, Swiss - 21, Swedish - 18, 
French - 17, and Canadian - 15. In total twenty-two nationalities 
were represented at that date. Investment from overseas in the period 
I960-'78, amounted to £l,644m, with the U.S. accounting for more than 
50% of this total. There has though, been a noticeable change in the 
last few years, particularly with the establishing of a number of very 
capital intensive Japanese concerns during the 1970's. 199 (31.0%) of
the overseas concerns operating in 1979 had established by 1970.
Since then there appears to have been a very considerable upsurge in 
the number of starts, with 262 established in 1972. During the period 
of the I.D.A.'s 1973 Plan, more firms invested in Ireland than in the 
previous thirteen years, with 287 plants being added to the total in
1Derived from 'Overseas Sponsored Companies in Ireland', I.D.A. Dublin 
1979.
just four years. It should be noted that these figures refer to the 
start dates of firms still in existence in 1979, and therefore do not 
accurately show the actual number of 'starts' in any given period. 
Nevertheless, they do serve to indicate the large volume of foreign 
investments which have been attracted to Ireland since the policy 
changes of the late 1950's, and more particularly, the rapid increase 
in the rate of establishment since the early 1970's, corresponding 
with Ireland's entry into the E.E.C.. Early indications for the lat­
est Plan period (1978-'82) show an even stronger performance than 
before, with 92 overseas enterprises commencing production during 
1978 alone.
Many studies have suggested a relationship between nationality 
and size and location of firms in Ireland (Blackborn, 1972; McAleese, 
1977; O'Farrell,1978a). Considerable variation in workforce size by 
nationality of firm was indicated by a study of 267 new overseas firms 
in 1974 (McAleese, 1977, p.20). The largest employers were Dutch, 
with an average of 395 employees per plant, followed by U.S. - 187, 
U.K. - 100 and German - 86. The global average plant size was found 
to be 135. Table 14 indicates a strong preference by Dutch firms to 
locate in N.D.A.'s, and hence by implication it would appear that 
larger plants tend to be located in the more developed regions - more 
than 50% of the Dutch plants can be found in the East and South-East 
Regions alone. In complete contrast are the German firms, with only 
6% of these being in the East Region and a further 13.0% in the 
South-East, preferring instead to locate in the D.A.'s - 34.0% of 
German firms can be found in the South-West Regions, which confirms 
the finding by Blackborne of a noted attraction to German firms of a 
location in Co. Kerry. While U.K. firms would appear slightly more 
likely to choose a D.A. location, there is no clear cut pattern for 
firms of U.S. origin - 25.6% of these are found in the East Region, 
but a further 23.5% are located in the Mid-West, largely explained by 
the number which have been attracted to Shannon. Amongst the remain­
ing 126 firms from overseas, Table 14 shows a preference for a N.D.A. 
or 'mixed' region1 location, but disaggregating to County level shows 
more than 60% of the total locating in N.D.A.'s.
1'Mixed' regions include - South-West, Mid-West, Midlands and North- 
East.
TABLE 14.Origin and Regional Distribution
of Overseas Enterprises, 1978
Region
U.
No.
S.
%
U
No.
.K.
%
GERMAN 
No. %
DUTCH 
No. %
OTHER 
No. %
E 55 25.6 48 27.5 6 6.0 11 29.7 24 19.0
SE 20 9.3 19 10.9 13 13.0 8 21.6 11 8.7
SW 33 15.3 34 19.5 34 34.0 6 16.2 31 24.6
MW 50 23.5 21 12.0 16 16.0 4 10.8 25 19.8
W 24 11.2 7 4.0 10 10.0 - - 10 7.9
NW 2 0.9 7 4.0 7 7.0 1 2.7 1 0.8
DON 2 0.9 6 3.4 2 2.0 1 2.7 4 3.2
MIDS 13 6.0 13 7.4 7 2.0 4 10.8 6 4.8
NE 16 7.4 20 11.4 4 4.0 2 5.4 14 11.1
TOTAL 215 100.0 175 100.0 99 100.0 37 100.0 126 100.0
Source: Derived from published list of overseas manufacturing
concerns in Ireland, I.D.A., Dublin 1979.
As exact employment figures for each plant are not available to 
the author it is difficult to establish the true relationship between 
plant size and location, but it can be surmised that the tendency for 
overseas firms, as with those of Irish origin is for larger plants to 
locate in N.D.A.'s, and smaller plants to choose D.A. locations. A 
more detailed analysis of firm characteristics in both a D.A. and N.D.A. 
region will, however, be presented later.
4.5.3 New industry sectoral characteristics. Table 15 confirms a
significant difference in the sectoral composition of N.I. from that 
of industry as a whole, as measured in terms of job potential for 
approved projects, both in the period April '74 to December '76, and 
those projected for 1978-'82. There is a noticeable, and not unexpect­
ed shift towards a more 'modern' industrial structure. Food, drink and
TABLE 15. Sectoral Distribution of Employment
Sector1
Employment 
at Dec. 
1976 (%)
New Industry Job 
Approvals, 
April '74 - Dec.'76
Expected Jobs 
1978-82 %
Projected
distribution2
1982
1+2 27 13 7,000 9 22
3 10 17 6,700 9 10
4 8 4 5,400 7 8
5 4 2 1,600 2 3
6 8 2 2,100 3 6
7 5 13 6,000 8 6
8 6 1 2,000 3 5
9 23 35 33,000 44 29
10 9 13
ooCNtH 15 11
TOTAL 100 100 75,000 100 100
2for explanation of key see Table 13.
2assumes all I.D.A. targets achieved, with no losses.
Source: Programme for National Development, 1978-81, p.47, and I.D.A.
Plan 1978-'82.
tobacco, for example, traditionally a dominant sector in employment 
terms, accounted for 27% of the manufacturing workforce in December 
1976, but only 13% of the approved jobs in the previous twenty months 
were in this sector. Projected to account for only 9% of new jobs in 
1978-'82, this highlights the important part being played by the
I.D.A.'s New Industry Programme in broadening Ireland's manufacturing 
base. In contrast there has been a notable expansion of employment in 
the metals and engineering sector. Accounting for 23% of employment 
at the end '76, 35% of approved jobs were in this sector in the first 
period (above), and it is planned to account for 44% of the new jobs 
in the '78 Plan period, adding 33,000 jobs to a sector which employed 
45,800 at December 1977. Also of note are the relative performances 
in the chemicals and 'other manufacturing' sectors, and also of the 
textiles industry,-which is undergoing considerable change through
the growth of plants manufacturing synthetics. The sectoral shares 
of manufacturing employment at 1982 are based on I.D.A. projections 
for employment growth during the life of the 1978 Plan. They do not, 
however, take into consideration any job losses in the non-I.D.A. 
assisted sector during that period. Firms not assisted by the- I.D.A. 
are rapidly decreasing in number, and while it is admitted that the 
1982 figure is inaccurate it is felt that the general sectoral trends 
which it indicates will not be greatly divorced from reality.
The I.D.A. have outlined in the '78 Plan (p.9) six main areas 
in which growth is to be encouraged, including electronics, mechanical 
engineering, consumer goods, healthcare/chemicals, food and other 
growth sub-sectors. In all except food, the growth strategy is con­
centrating on product areas which are relatively new to manufacturing 
in Ireland, and even in the food sector itself growth is to be encour­
aged by product diversification and expansion of ancillary tasks such 
as processing and packaging, rather than simply through increased out­
put. While Ireland has had considerable success in attracting such 
investments from abroad in recent years - 65 electronics firms with a 
potential for 12,000 jobs have been secured by the I.D.A. in the past 
five years1 - considerable scope exists for much of the growth envis­
aged to come from 'home' industry. A study by O'Farrell of 300 firms 
showed that of £900m worth of goods and services bought by them in 
1976, half was supplied by Irish firms, but in the metals and engin­
eering group, only 16% by value of needs were met in Ireland. A 
similar supply imbalance has also accompanied the recent rapid growth 
in the electronics sector - £140m of electronics investment had been 
secured in the first nine months of 1979, compared with £100m in the 
previous six years.2 At a conference held in November 1979, the I.D.A. 
outlined to 180 representatives of Irish engineering and electronics 
firms the component requirements of 16 international electronics 
firms, valued at £25m per annum. It was hoped to encourage Irish 
firms, where possible, to meet these needs, which it was estimated 
would require an additional employment of 1,000 workers.
11 Glasgow Herald1 - 5/4/79, p.7.
2'Evening Herald' (Dublin) - 23/11/79.
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Overseas firms have contributed quite substantially to 
'advanced technology' growth in Ireland in recent years. In 1979,
22% of these were engaged in engineering and machinery, 15% in tex­
tiles and clothing, including synthetic fibre production, and 13% in 
electronics and electrical goods. In addition to the 50% in these 
three sectors, a further 20% were involved in other fast growth 
sectors, including plastics and rubber, chemicals and pharmaceuticals 
and scientific instruments. 1
A point to note, however, and one which will be returned to 
later is that ranking the 9 Planning Regions according to the numbers 
of these growth industries located there, the most underdeveloped 
Regions - Donegal and the North-West - consistently rank 7th to 9th 
by sectoral representation, which could perhaps indicate a lower 
potential for future employment growth in these regions.
4.6 Small Industries Programme.
The important contribution which small industries can make to 
employment is being increasingly recognised in Ireland as elsewhere. 
Blaise Gillie suggests two reasons for supporting the growth of small 
industries -
1 . from the long-term point of view it is important to encourage
the emergence of additional entrepreneurs even if most enterprises 
never exceed the smallest scale.
2. the development of local industry on even a very small scale is 
valuable in maintaining the morale and social health of small 
communities.
Small firms have also often proved a very fertile seed-bed for 
innovation, and, with proper financial backing, can enable new 
entrepreneurial skills and new products and processes to enter the 
industrial field. As they are generally free of locational 
restrictions the promotion of small firms can be particularly 
beneficial to smaller, more remote settlements which are unlikely to 
attract the larger concerns.
The I.D.A. launched its Small Industries Programme in three 
pilot areas in 1967. By January 1968 all the D.A.'s had been 
incorporated into the scheme, and this was extended to the whole
1Figures derived from published list of overseas firms in Ireland, 
I.D.A. 1979.
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country, with the exception of Dublin City, in the following year.
The Dublin anomoly was finally removed in 1975. The principal 
objectives were to generate new small industries and to provide 
finance and advice to existing ones, to create employment, especially 
in small towns and villages, and to help Irish promoters to set up 
their own businesses.' Initially the programme applied to firms 
employing up to 50 people with fixed assets of £100,000 or less in 
the D.A.'s and up to 30 employees and £60,000 in the N.D.A.'s.
These qualifications have since been revised to include all firms 
employing up to 50 people, with fixed assets of not more than £300,000. 
This, however, brings 75$ of all manufacturing concerns in the country 
within the scope of this Programme.
In its first year 46 projects were approved for aid, with a 
jobs potential of 387 at full production. By 1974 a total of 1,139 
projects had been approved with a possibility of 9,954 jobs resulting.
In the first ten years of the programme 1,300 new and existing small 
firms were assisted. These employed 16,810 people in December 1977, 
a figure expected to rise to 18,356 at full production. The Programme 
took a sharp upturn in 1978, with 5,713 new jobs approved, but more 
significant is the fact that 94$ of the projects in 1978 were of Irish 
origin.
In recent years a number of factors have given an additional 
boost to this Programme. The first came through the creation of the 
I.D.A.'s Project Identification Unit in 1975* A substantial proportion 
of small industry sales are directed at the 'home' market. Therefore it 
was felt that to aid projects in certain product lines would be to 
promote needless competition between 'home' producers, which would 
increase the rate of industry closures in sectors where the market is 
already suffering from excess capacity. To avoid what would appear to 
be a self-defeating promotional exercise the Unit seeks out projects/ 
product areas which can be fruitfully exploited, with a particular 
emphasis on export sales. The only flaw in this is that in refusing 
to assist firms in areas of over-capacity it is possible that more 
efficient producers are being discriminated against. Nevertheless, 
the work of the Unit is perhaps vindicated by the fact that over half
'Small Industries Programme, Annual Heport 1977 and Review 1967-77, 
I.D.A. 1978 p.l.
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the projects approved for grant assistance had an export component.
The Unit also identifies areas in which import substitution is possible 
and seeks out firms with the appropriate technical and managerial skills 
to undertake manufacture of such products - 19 firms were assisted in 
this way in 1978.
The launching of the Enterprise Development Scheme in 1977 has 
been, perhaps, the biggest single advance since the Small Industries 
Programme started. Through this scheme, one of the main restraints 
on the establishing and expansion of many small firms has been effectively 
removed with the provision of working capital by the I.D.A., in addition 
to the normal range of incentives. In its first year there were 22 
project approvals, with a jobs potential of 897• Total investment 
amounted to £5.1m, which included I.D.A. support in fixed asset grants, 
loan guarantees and equity of £3.1m 60% of the total project costs.
The inclusion of Dublin City in the overall programme, on a 
partial basis in 1975? and fully integrated in 1977, has made a 
substantial difference to the number of project approvals since then. 
Approximately 35% of the country's small manufacturing firms are located 
in Dublin. The inclusion of this area into the Programme was 
necessitated by the adverse effects of the mid-70's recession which 
had led to relatively high closure rates, particularly amongst small 
Aimer city films, and which consequently led to contraction of the 
employed workforce in Dublin as a whole. 60 projects were approved for 
aid in the City in 1977, and this almost doubled in 1978, reaching 117 - 
30% of total approvals for the country in that year.
The final element in the Programme is the construction of cluster 
factories to help alleviate the acute shortage of small relatively 
inexpensive premises which it was felt had prevented a more rapid 
expansion of small industries. Initially cluster units were to be 
provided at nine locations in eight of the larger towns, but the 
programme outlined in the 1978 Plan has been substantially expanded, 
with half a million sqaure feet of floor space to be provided in cluster 
and advance factory units at 36 different locations by 1980, with further 
development as necessary to 1982. By December 1978 premises for small 
industries, both constructed and at the planning stage, covered 60 
different towns, excluding the Mid-West Region (where small industry 
development was the preserve of S.P.A.D. Co.), thus extending over the
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entire urban hierarchy. The list included Easkey, Keel, Clifden and 
Cahirciveen, all west coast D.A. towns which had failed to attract any 
industry, and which the I.D.A. acknowledged as being too small to 
attract the larger overseas concerns (1978 Plan p.30).
The increasing importance of the Small Industries Programme to 
the I.D.A.’s entire industrial strategy can be measured from the fact 
that small industries are scheduled to provide an additional 6,000 job 
commitments per annum in the 1978 Plan. It is also of major 
consequence to achieving the jobs dispersal objective, particularly in 
relation to development in more remote rural settlements. As will be 
seen below, the financial returns are quite substantial, with costs per 
job markedly lower in small industries than for the medium to large 
concerns dealt with under the New Industries Programme. In the light 
of recent developments, with small industry showing a fairly strong 
growth performance, and with the innovation of the Enterprise Development 
Scheme and the Product Identification Unit, the opportunities for the 
future expansion of the small industries sector look quite promising.
It is suggested, therefore, that if Ireland is to decrease its 
dependence on overseas investment, and reduce its present ’industrial' 
import bill, it is in the area of small industry development that future 
efforts must increasingly be directed.
4*7. I.D.A. Industry Programme - Expenditure.
Under the 1975 Industrial Development (No. 2) Act, there is an 
aggregate limit of £400m. on I.D.A. grant expenditure, and a further 
£100m. on borrowing guarantees. These have yet to be exceeded, but 
should there be any possibility that they might, it is more than likely 
that the Authority's cash limits would simply be extended. It is little 
wonder then that Ireland is able to offer grants to match any offered by 
its rivals. Added to the above it should also be noted that E.P.Tj;R. 
has been worth about £25m. per annum, and fiscal incentives a further 
£10m. (Allen, 1977 p.119). The recent Mostek' saga perhaps demonstrated, 
more than anything else, the resources available to the I.D.A. to attract 
industry.
Table 16 illustrates the change in the approved grant cost per 
job to the I.D.A. in the period 1975-78. The difference in costs 
between the small industries and the medium to large concerns supported
’I.D.A. repeatedly topped any offer to the company from the S.D.A., 
and hence ’stole' a valuable micro-electronics investment.
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TABLE 16 I.D.A. Approved Grant Costs Per Job (£)
1975 1976 1977 1978
Medium to Large Industry: New Overseas 5170 3770 5060
Domestic 3780 4000 3510
Small Industry : Domestic 1860 2030 1670 2169
Source: Derived from I.D .A. Annual Reports. & 1978 Plan, p*26
TABLE 17 I.D.A. Job Approval and Costs, 1976--78
1976 1977 1978 1974-78
No. of Jobs Approved 18,312 24,028 30,221 107,097
Total Grant Committed (£M) 67.3 121.8 154.5 477.4
Grant per Job (£) 3,674 5,069 5,114 4457.5
Source: Derived from I.D.A. Annual Reports.
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under the New Industries programme is quite striking, and perhaps gives 
further support to the argument that more emphasis should be put in the 
future on growth through small industry development. Another important 
feature is the higher grant cost to 'Domestic1 N.I. in 1978 than to 
'overseas' concerns. This is in part explained by a few very large 
capital intensive investment projects, but it is a pattern which should 
be discouraged, as such high costs may make it less attractive to 
support indigenous industrial growth in the future. The enormous 
increase in the I.D.A.'s total grant commitment in the past few years 
is indicated by table 17. The average grant committed per job has also 
risen quite significantly, but so too has the annual level of job 
commitments. Total approvals in the five years 1974-78, at 107,097 
are equal in number to half of the existing labour force engaged in 
manufacturing industry.
It would no doubt be argued by the I.D.A. that the "ends justify 
the means", and that the grant provided for each job created is not too 
high a priee to pay to make Ireland one of the most modem, and most 
competitive industrial areas in Europe. Competitors on the other hand, 
might take a different view, arguing that the I.D.A. is unfairly and 
unnecessarily forcing up job creation costs elsewhere. Actual capital 
expenditure in 1978 was £87.5m. - an increase of 45$ over the previous 
year, while total capital grants committed in 1978 amounted to £154m.
With a further commitment of £17m. in training grants, this makes a total 
I.D.A. commitment in that single year of £171m. This is appriximately 
half of the entire resources of near rival, the S.D.A. It is not
difficult, then, to understand why the S.D.A. at least has experienced 
difficulty in competing on equal terms with the I.D.A. in attracting 
footloose overseas investment.
4.8. Case Studies: the West and South-East Regions.
This section seeks to compare the industrial structure of both a
D.A. - the West Region, and a N.D.A. - the South-East Region. More 
particularly it attempts to ascertain differences between foreign owned 
and indigenous manufacturing units, in terms of product and plant age, 
and of location by D.A. and N.D.A. At the outset the following 
reservations must be noted. Firstly, the information presented has been 
extracted from raw data - the initial results of an annual industrial 
census carried out by the respective regional offices of the I.D.A. The 
ma^or drawback is the lack of a standard firm-size classification for both
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TABLE 18 Manufacturing Establishments in the South East
Region, 1978, by Size and Nationality
Employment
Origin 1-9 10-24 25-49 50-99 100-199 200-499 500+ Total
U.S. - 1 7 2 5 3 - 18
U.K. 1 7 4 2 3 2 - 19
GERMAN 1 3 - 3 3 2 1 13
DUTCH 1 1 3 - 2 1 - 8
OTHER - 2 3 2 3 - - 10
TOTAL
OVERSEAS
3 14 17 9 16 71 1 671
IRISH 292 153 75 47 31 12 3 613
TOTAL 295 167 92 56 47 19 4 680
Source: I.D.A. South-East Region Industrial Census (unpublished).
TABLE 19 Manufacturing Establishments in the West 
Region, 1978, by Size and Nationality
Origin 1-5 5-20 20-50 50-100 100+ Total
U.S. - 1 6 1 11 19
U.K. - - 1 2 3 6
GERMAN - 2 4 2 1 9
OTHER - 2 2 4 8
TOTAL
OVERSEAS
- 5 121 5 181 40
IRISH 176 119 30 24 10 359
TOTAL 176 124 42 29 28 399
Source: I.D.A. West Region Industrial Census (unpublished).
Arithmetical discrepancy due to inclusion of dual nationality 
projects.
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regions, although it is hoped that this does not detract too much from 
the general comparisons presented below. Secondly, the sectoral 
classification adopted is far from comprehensive, but is rather a simple 
grouping of industries to highlight differences between ’traditional1 
and more 'modemf industrial concerns. Thirdly, the data presented is 
that extracted from the industrial census material only, and therefore 
may not directly correspond with regional totals quoted elsewhere.
Tables 18 and 19 indicate a difference in both regions between 
firm size as between Irish and overseas establishments. In the lowest 
two employment categories foreign firms are noticeable by their absence, 
but in contrast they are proportionally overrepresented in the larger 
category size. While it is difficult to generalise, due to the 
comparability problems already outlined, some differences can be noted 
between the two regions. Looking at firm size it‘can be seen that 
although a larger proportion of firms in the S.E. region employ in 
excess of 100 people than is the case in the West 10.3$ and 7.0$ 
respectively, ;the proportion within this group that is foreign owned is 
much greater in the less developed West - 64$, than in the S.E. - 34$. 
There is little difference at the other end of the scale, with the 
proportion of firms with less than 50 employees and of overseas origin 
being 5.0 and 6.0$ respectively for the West and S.E. Regions. Taking 
these regions to be representative of D.A.'s and N.D.A.'s, the results 
would seem to suggest a lack of indigenous investment in the D.A.'s in 
larger scale industries. The industrial growth of the West today can to 
a sizeable degree be attributed to the location there of a number of 
relatively large scale foreign enterprises, which would tend to support 
the findings of Hannon and O'Carroll (see Ross, 1978 p.328) of - 
"a high commitment to a particular variety of regional 
development, primarily through transplanted industrial 
development whereby local industrial development happened 
as a matter of fate or was provided by a benign central 
government.''
Fogarty (see Kennedy and Bruton, 1975 p.143) found a general satisfaction 
among Irish entrepreneurs with the incentive support system for new 
enterprises, but a lack of entrepreneurs to take advantage of it. This 
would appear to be particularly true for the D.A.'s, which will have 
tended to lose a far greater proportion of their 'educated' population 
than the N.D.A.'s. In comparison, although overseas investment is well 
represented in the N.D.A. of the S.E., the region has a much stronger
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'domestic1 sector on which to build.
The majority of larger firms come from the U.S., but the relative 
numerical strengths of those from the U.K., Germany and the Netherlands 
do not appear to correspond to the pattern outlined by O'Farrell (1978 
(a)) for D.A./N.D.A. locations. The difference may perhaps be explained
by the distortion caused to O'Farrells N.D.A. figures by the inclusion of
the untypical East Region. It has been observed that -
"the probability of a town of specific size group attracting 
N.I. investment does not vary regionally in Ireland, but
that the probabilities do vary substantially by town size."
(O'Farrell, 1978 (a) p.173).
This, it is claimed, indicates the success of the I.D.A. -
"in eliminating interregional differences in perceived 
locational attractiveness by investors" (ibid. p.172).
Neverthless some interesting trends are revealed by a study of the 
location of industry in both the West and South-East Regions. To 
some extent supporting 0'Farrells findings, there is little regional 
variation in the proportion of enterprises found in towns of 5,000 
inhabitants or more - 55.4$ of those in the West, and 53*4$ in the South- 
East. There is, however, a notable difference in the location pattern 
of overseas enterprises: 67*5% located in those larger settlements in
the West, but an even higher proportion, 86.6$ did so in the South East. 
The explanation for this may lie partly in the existence of a more 
comprehensive urban structure in the latter region, but the fact that a 
larger proportion of these firms located outside the larger towns in the 
West may be an indication of a limited degree of success on the part of 
the I.D.A. in bringing 'jobs to the people'.
The employment impact may not, however, be so great as the global 
figure for industry distribution would tend to suggest, 18 of the 28 
plants in the West employing more than 100 workers are foreign owned, 
and would therefore be expected to have been subject to locational 
influence by the I.D.A. Yet 50$ of these are found in Galway City 
alone, and almost 90$ are found in the five towns of 5,000+: inhabitants. 
Even taking a lower employment threshold of 50 employees, 70$ of firms 
over this size are located in the same five towns. Similarly the 
greatest impact in employment terms coming from the 40 foreign firms in 
the region, and more particularly from the 18 of those employing 100+ 
is felt in only five locations. It is questionable therefore whether 
this 'new' investment being brought to the area by the I.D.A., will
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succeed in maintaining as desired the existing settlement pattern, 
or whether, as would appear more likely, it will simply hasten a 
rationalisation of this pattern, (fig* 4)
In the South-East 70 firms employ more than 100 workers, of which 
24 are ’foreign’, a much lower proportion than in the West. Including 
the lower size category, down to 50 employees, there are 128 firms, of 
which 33 are foreign - just 26$ compared with over 50$ in the West region. 
These figures are interesting in that they suggest that in proportionate 
terms at least larger overseas firms have found a D.A. location more 
attractive than one in a N.D.A. As with the West, these overseas firms 
which have located in the South-East tend to favour the larger 
settlements - 80$ of those employing more than 100, and 85$ of those 
with 50 or more employees were found in these towns.
Using a simple four sector classification, certain differences 
can be observed in the sectoral composition of both domestic and overseas 
concerns, and as between regions. The food sector (l) is far more 
important in the agriculturally more fertile S.E. than West region, where
Table 20 Sectoral Distribution of Industrial Concerns - West and South 
East Regions, 1978.
Sector
West Region ($) 
Overseas Irish Total
South-East Region ($) 
Overseas Irish Total
1. Pood, Drink & Tobacco _ 20 18 7 30 28
2. Textiles, clothing & 
footwear 26 6 8 16 5 6
3. Electronics, Electrical 
and Mechanical 
Engineering 43 18 21 49 10 13
4* Other 30 56 53 28 55 52
this is noted not simply by the lower proportion of firms in this sector 
but by the complete absence of overseas investment. While textiles are 
not so strongly represented in both regions there is far more involvement 
of overseas firms in this sector in the West region, with synthetics and 
general casual clothing being dominant. An important factor in this is 
that it is largely female employing, and although encouraging them to 
move to larger centres within the region, at least it contributes to 
stemming the outward tide of female migrants which has been characteristic 
of the D.A.'s in particular.
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The third sector, encompassing many of the advanced technology 
industries, has a stronger representation in the West, where it includes 
21%> of all industrial enterprises, compared with only \y% in the South- 
East, where also plant size tends to be smaller. The final category, 
which includes just over half the firms in each region, is dominated by 
domestic, and particularly small scale enterprises, encompassing largely 
more traditional crafts such as furniture making and metal work.
In all sectors the percentage share of the overseas concerns is 
quite distinct from that of Irish firms, this, it is felt, being a 
reflection of the diversification and general broadening of the industrial 
structure which has come about in both regions as a result of the injection 
of new investment, encouraged by the I.D.A. In general, though, it would 
seem that the West Region has fared proportionately better than the South- 
East through the I.D.A.'s efforts towards industrial growth. While the 
benefits may have been felt mainly in a few larger settlements, in terms 
of overall regional performance the attraction of new industry has brought 
a new air of prosperity to the West, particularly to Galway City, which 
with the growth of employment opportunity resulting from the success of 
the I.D.A.'s industrial estate there, has seen its population increase by 
a third in the '70's.
The only cautionary note is that, going by the experience of the
D.A. and N.D.A. studied here, too much effort may be being directed at 
particular areas and locations to the exclusion of others in greater need 
of help.
4.9* I.D.A. Achievements in Perspective.
4.9*1. The General Pattern: Already noted is the large volume of
investment by the I.D.A. in job creation and support programmes, and
also the substantial levels of job commitments which have resulted. In
addition, mention has also been given of the Authoritys specific objective 
of achieving regional convergence in terms of overall economic development 
and in employment opportunities. A number of indices will be used to 
measure achievements to date, but the successes boasted by the I.D.A., at 
least in relation to job creation,must be put into perspective by comparison 
with change in the manufacturing sector as a whole.
The pattern of national and regional manufacturing employment 
change for the period 1961-78 is revealed in table 21. Net change 
averaged an increase of just over 3»000 jobs per annum, but there was
by no means a consistent increase each year. A much higher rate of net
job creation can be observed for the first period to 1971 than from
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TABLE 22. Regional Distribution of Manufacturing Employment 
and Proportion of National Population (%)
Manufacturing Employment Population
Region 1961 1971 1978 1982 (est. j 1 1971 1979
DON 2.4 2.6 2.7 3.3 3.6 3.6
NW 1.2 1.3 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.4
W 3.3 3.5 6.0 7.3 8.7 8.4
MW 6.0 7.5 7.8 8.7 9.1 8.9
SW 15.1 15.0 15.7 15.4 15.6 15.3
SE 8.9 9.6 11.2 11.3 11.0 10.9
E 52.2 48.8 42.0 37.9 35.7 37.3
NE 6.7 7.6 7.4 7.5 5.8 5.7
MIDS 4.2 4.0 5.3 6.1 - 7.8 7.5
1from I. 
to 1982
D.A. job creation targets: assumes zero job losses
Source: derived from O'Farrell, P 
Plans 1978-82, p.46.
.N., 1975, p .15, and I.D.A.
TABLE 23. I.D.A. Regional Job Creation Targets 
and Achievements, 1973-77
Region
Net
Target
Gross
Target
1973
Gains
-  1977  
Losses
Net
Change
% Target 
Achieved
Target,
197 8 -82
DON 2 , 0 0 0 2 , 8 0 0 2 , 3 0 0 1 , 5 0 0 800 40 4 , 0 0 0
NW i— * u> o o
oor-T—1
oo00tH 700 1 , 1 0 0 85 3 , 0 0 0
W 4 , 2 0 0 5 , 3 5 0 7 , 3 5 0 2 , 2 0 0 5 , 1 5 0 123 8 , 5 0 0
MW 2 , 8 0 0 5 , 4 0 0 5 , 3 0 0 5 , 3 0 0 - - 8 , 5 0 0
SW 7 , 0 0 0 9 , 4 0 0 9 , 1 0 0 8 , 1 0 0 O o o 14 1 1 , 0 0 0
SE 3 , 2 0 0 4 , 7 0 0 7 , 2 0 0 4 , 4 5 0 2 , 7 5 0 86 8 , 5 0 0
E 1 0 , 3 0 0
oo<r>r-t H 1 4 , 6 0 0 2 5 , 6 5 0 - 1 1 , 0 5 0 - 1 9 , 0 0 0
NE 3 , 4 0 0 5 , 3 0 0 4 , 5 0 0 5 , 5 0 0 -  1 , 0 0 0 - 6 , 0 0 0
MIDS 2 , 8 0 0 3 , 4 5 0 5 , 3 5 0 2 , 2 0 0 3 , 1 5 0 113 6 , 5 0 0
TOTAL 3 8 , 0 0 0 5 5 , 0 0 0 5 7 , 5 0 0 5 5 , 6 0 0 1 ,9 0 0 5 7 5 , 0 0 0
Source: I.D.A. Regional Industrial Plans 1978-82, pp.43-44.
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TABLE 24 Planned and Actual Change in Regional 
Manufacturing Employment (%)
Region
1973
Planned
-77
Actual
1977-80
Planned
1978-82
Planned
DON 37.7 15.1 49 65.6
NW 39.4 33.3 39 68.2
W 49.1 60.2 34 62.0
MW 21.2 - 20 47.3
SW 20.0 2.8 19 30.6
SE 13.8 11.9 17 32.9
E 9.6 -10.3 11 19.7
NE 18.9 - 5.6 20 35.3
MIDS 31.1 35.0 31 53.5
TOTAL _ 16.7 0.8 18 32.6
Source: I.D.A. Regional Industrial Plans
TABLE 25 Change in Regional Share of Manufacturing Employment, 
Exclusive of the East Region, 1961-78 (%)
Region 1961 1971 1978
DON 5.0 5.0 4.6
NW 2.5 2.6 3.3
W 6.8 6.9 10.3
MW 12.5 14.6 13.5
SW 31.7 29.3 27.1
SE 18.5 18.8 19.4
NE 13.9 14.9 12.8
MIDS 8.9 7.8 9.1
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: derived from O'Farrell 
and I.D.A. Plans, 1978
, P.N.,
-82, p.
1975, p.15, 
46.
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1971-78. Table 23 in fact shows that within this second period, for 
the five years of the I.D.A.'s 1973 Plan, the net increase in 
manufacturing employment was only 1,900 jobs. While manufacturing 
employment as a whole increased by 19.1% in 1961-71, and a further 7.5$ 
in 1971-78, during the time of the 73 Plan there was a net gain of only 
0,8%.
With the above performance in mind it is suggested that the 
I.D.A.'s well oiled publicity machine has been playing a very shrewd 
numbers game* The stark reality is that during the last decade at 
least, the Authority has done little more than offset losses rather than 
achieving substantial gains in employment, and this at increasing costs 
too. In 1961-71 the I.D.A.'s industrial programme was fairly 
successful, with only 461 of the additional 34,197 manufacturing jobs 
being generated by the non-I.D.A. assisted sector (O'Farrell, 1975 p.15). 
However, during the life-time of the 1973 Plan, although the Authority's 
gross job creation target of 55,000 jobs was actually exceeded by 2,500 
(table 23), with losses of 55,600 in the same period the net change in 
employment was negligible, with in effect only 5$ of the I.D.A.'s target 
being achieved. Geary and Dempsey (1977 P*57) reveal that heavy job 
losses were sustained particularly in 1974 and 1975: a net increase of
7,800 manufacturing jobs in 1973 changed to net decreases of 3,700 and 
14,100 in 1974 and '75 respectively. The upturn came in 1976, but in 
the meantime manufacturing had undergone a major structural shift, with 
much new investment being directed also at cost reduction and therefore 
with less benefits in employment terms (see Durkan, 1978 p.47). McAleese 
(1977 p.77) records a very high number of industrial closures from mid- 
1973 to end '75. 852 projects received N.I. grants to end '74, of which
170, corresponding to 154 firms, had ceased production by end '75. 52
of these firms closed after mid-'73. By including these extra 18 months, 
a closure rate by enterprise, of 20$ was recorded by McAleese in 1975, 
compared with 15.8$ by 0'Farrell in mid-'73* The loss in N.I. grants is 
estimated at 12.6$ - £18.6m. It is interesting to note, however, that
by excluding closures amongst firms established in 1953-60, which it can 
be assumed suffered adversely from having to operate in the E.E.C. 
without the 'protection' under which they had established, the failure 
rate,in: terms of grant lost, decreases to 10.7$. A more positive note 
is sounded by the downward trend in the rate of closures since 1975. In 
that year 77 firms ceased operation, but in 1976 the number was 61, with
80
a loss of 3>619 jobs. The respective figures for 1977 and 1978 were 
32 and 3>337 jobs, and 41 and 2,824 jobs (i.D.A. 1978 Annual Report, p,14). 
The proportion of jobs lost through closures which have been 'replaced11 by 
the I.D.A. are 55$, 48$, and 83$ respectively in 1976. '77 and '78.
Since 1976 there has been a net increase in manufacturing 
employment of 15,000 jobs, but even this is insufficient to suggest that 
the employment growth targeted for by the I.D.A. to 1982 is ever likely 
to be achieved. The increase of 0.8$ in manufacturing employment in 
1973-77 should be compared with the targeted increase of 16.7$. This 
would seem to indicate that the growth of 33$ hoped for in 1978-82, ±3 to 
say the least, optimistic. These figures are not, however, presented as 
a criticism of the I.D.A. It has already pointed out that very little 
growth has occurred in industry without I.D.A. assistance. Had the 
Authority not existed, particularly in the recessionary period of the 
mid-'70's, it is difficult to imagine what heights the level of 
unemployment might have reached by now. Indeed, it would be fairly 
true to say that had this been the case, the need would have been such 
that some similar type of body would have emerged to fulfil the same 
developmental role.
4.9.2. The Regional Objective: To be seen to have succeeded in
bringing about an improvement in the relative positions of the D.A.'s 
with respect to the N.D.A.'s., a notable change in the regional shares of 
manufacturing employment would be the minimum expected outcome. Tables 
21 to 24 in fact reveal a somewhat mixed performance. In 1961-71 three 
distinct regional groupings emerge from a study of percentage change in 
regional manufacturing employment (table 21). The best performances 
were recorded in the Mid-West (+49.3$) and North East (+36.2$).
Regions, reflecting fairly significant N.D.A. employment growth in the 
towns of Dundalk, Drogheda and Limerick, and also the attraction of 
Shannon. The middle group consists of the West, North-West, Donegal and 
South-East Regions, all recording increases of about 30$. The most 
encouraging factor here is the relatively strong performances of the 
wholly ’designated' regions. The lowest growth rates were recorded in 
the East, Midlands and South-West Regions, all of which experienced a 
decrease in their respective shares of national manufacturing employment 
(table 22). However, although the D.A.’s did increase their shares
'firms taken over with I.D.A. assistance, or premises occupied by a new 
firm.
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regional convergence in this period was a qualified success, since 
the greatest proportionate shifts were experienced in the N.D.A.?s 
of the North and South-East Regions, and in the Mid-West, which is an 
anomoly, due to the existence of Shannon.
A different pattern from that above, emerges post-*71. In 
percentage terms there is a clear indication of a swing in favour of 
the D.A.’s, particularly those of the West and North-West Regions which 
experienced an increase on their manufacturing employment base of 81.8$ 
and 54.4$ respectively, from 1971 to 1978 (table 21). A very favourable 
performance was exhibited by the 'mixed' Midlands Region, which had fared 
so badly in the previous decade, and by the South-East Region, which 
produced the second highest absolute employment increase, next to that 
of the West. In contrast the East shows a disastrous slump, with its 
labour force involved in manufacturing contracting by more than 7$.
This is perhaps attributable to the closure of many inefficient 
manufacturing concerns during the recession, which probably also 
explains the relative stagnation in the other 'traditional' industrial 
region, the North-East.
The above pattern is mirrored in the regional achievements under 
the I.D.A.'s 1973 Plan (table 23). The West and Midlands both exceeded 
their net job creation targets, while the North-West and South-East only 
marginally failed to do so. Although Donegal only achieved 40$ of its 
target, this was still a fairly strong performance when measured against 
those of the other Regions (table 24) and also when account is taken of 
its unfortunate geo-political situation.
The success or otherwise in achieving a more equitable 
distribution of manufacturing employment can be gauged from a comparison 
of the proportional share of national population as against manufacturing
employment in each Region (table 22). The most significant change has
occurred in the East Region which has seen its employment share decrease 
by more than ten percentage points from 1961 to 1978. The West Region, 
on the other hand shows the most notable improvement, with an increase of 
2.7 percentage points. Although there are still notable differences 
between the shares of population and manufacturing employment in each 
region the trend is definitely towards convergence of these two figures. 
Nevertheless, it must be asked how much of this 'success' can be 
attributed to the employment promotion programme of the I.D.A., and how
much is mere 'statistical success' brought about by the very poor
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TABLE 21 Regional Manufacturing Employment, 1961-1978
Region
Manufacturing Employment 
1961 1971 1978
Change, 
Actual
1961-71
%
Change, 
Actual
1971-78
%
DON 4,293 5,506 6,100 1,213 28.2 594 10.8
NW 2,187 2,850 4,400 663 30.3 1,550 54.4
W 5,842 7,536 13,700 1,694 30.0 6,164 81.8
MW 10,751 16,048 17,950 5,297 49.3 1,901 11.8
SW 27,183 32,115 36,000 4,932 18.1 3,885 12.1
SE 15,901 20,570 25,850 4,669 29.4 5,280 25.7
E 93,701 104,162 96,500 10,461 11.2 -7,662 -7.4
NE 11,968 16,301 17,000 4,333 36.2 699 4.3
MIDS 7,610 8,545 121,150 935 12.3 3,605 42.2
STATE 179,436 213,633 229,650 34,197 19.1 16,017 7.5
Source: O'Farrell, P.N., 1975, p.15, and I.D.A. Regional Industrial
Plans, 1978-82, p.46.
performance of the East-Region? Table 25 shows the change in the share 
of manufacturing employment of each region exclusive of the East. Again, 
as overleaf, the best performances were recorded by the West, North-West, 
South-East and Midlands Regions, but at the other end of the scale an 
important difference emerges. The percentage shares of Donegal, the 
Mid-West, the South-West all fell relative to those of the other regions, 
whereas with the inclusion of the East Region all these regions registered 
a relative improvement in position (table 22). The North-East Region, 
which showed an increase of 0.7 percentage points over the period 
1961-78 in the nine-region table, registered a decrease of 1.1 percentage 
points when only the eight regions are considered. These results put 
a significantly different light on the pattern of change earlier 
indicated, proving without doubt that the upturn in manufacturing in 
these regions has been more apparent than real. This should give 
cause for concern, particularly in the depressed Donegal region, which 
in 1978 managed to attract only 1.6$ of the grant aided jobs filled in
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that year. These performances indeed lend strength to the argument 
that the current I.D.A. Plan targets (table 24) owe more to ’psycho- 
political’ thinking than to the reality of the present climate for 
job creation, and cast serious doubt on the ability of the I.D.A. to 
positively alter employment prospects in the less favoured regions.
4.9*3* Regional Expenditure, 1978: A cursory glance at the
I.D.A..’s regional per capita expenditure in 1978 (table 26) and a 
comparison with past performance, would appear to suggest that the 
old adage, ’you get what you pay for’, applies as much to job creation 
as to anything else. A sweeping generalisation certainly, but it can 
be seen nevertheless that the four most successful regions already 
outlined received some of the highest levels of per capita grant in 
1978. The highest level was in fact recorded in the North-East 
Region. It is indeed to the I.D.A.'s credit that this region, which 
has suffered unduly in recent years through contraction of the 
manufacturing sector, should receive priority treatment, although it 
should be noted that there have been much higher levels of expenditure 
here on industrial estate and advance factory programmes, and on the 
promotion of joint venture schemes, all of which could not be expected 
to bear fruit immediately. At the other extreme lies the Donegal 
Region, ranked bottom in terms of per capita expenditure, which amounted 
to only 40$ of the State average. This approximates to the pattern 
of expenditure in 1977, and would therefore seem to imply that the 
number of jobs created is proportional to the level of I.D.A. 
expenditure in each region. Assuming this to be the case, then 
while the low level of expenditure in the East may be in keeping with 
the regional convergence aim, it seems more difficult to justify that 
for Donegal.
In contrast to the above pattern, however, the highest per 
job grant commitment in both 1977 and 1978 was in the Donegal region - 
£7,452 per job in 1978. This compares with £4,082 in the East. If 
it is true then, as O'Earrell claims, that the I.D.A.'s incentive 
package has overcome locational disadvantage by region, it would 
appear that this is being done at a very high cost indeed, and one 
which, in view of Ireland's present economic problems, the country 
may not be able to afford in the future.
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TABLE 26 I.D.A. Regional Per Capita Expenditure, 1978 (£)
Region
New
Industry
Small
Industry
Industrial
Estates
Re-
Equipment Other1 Total
Rank by 
Expenditure
DON 4.7 0.8 3.1 1.8 0.03 10.4 9
NW 17.5 2.5 8.7 1.9 0.6 31.2 5
W 24.3 1.4 5.8 0.9 0.3 32.7 2
MW 15.4 1.1 13.3 1.1 0.9 31.8 3=
SW 8.3 1.1 6.7 4.5 0.4 31.0 7
SE 15.6 1.4 12.2 2.4 0.2 31.8 3=
E 5.7 0.9 7.8 3.6 0.9 18.9 8
NE 13.0 3.7 21.8 5.8 10.9 55.2 1
MIDS 11.6 1.6 14.0 1.5 0.1 28.8 6
STATE 10.7 1.3 9.5 3.0 1.2 25.7
1includes expenditure on Joint Venture, Enterprise Development and Research 
and Development Programmes.
Source: Derived from I.D.A. Annual Report, 1978.
In summary, the I.D.A. has played a very influential role in guiding 
Ireland’s recent industrial progress. Through a very favourable and 
comprehensive development incentive package it has secured a very large 
volume of footloose overseas investment, and is continuing to take 
strident steps in this field. It has also encouraged the growth of the 
indigenous manufacturing sector, by the traditional method of offering 
lucrative financial incentives, but also through more innovatory measures 
such as the Small Industries and Enterprise Development Programmes, the 
Joint Venture Scheme, and programmes of Research and Development and 
Product Indentification. Yet its success has been a qualified one. On 
close examination the Authoritys boasts about job creation are not so 
laudable when measured against the losses in the same period. Numerous 
contradictions can be pointed to in its achievements in relation to both
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regional and national development objectives. Depending on the 
view taken, it may be claimed that the I,D.A. has in fact failed to 
make major progress in the field of manufacturing employment creation, 
with this sector merely 'ticking-over’ in employment terms in the 
last decade or so. On the other hand, with the help of the Authority 
Irish industry has diversified, modernised, and become much more 
competitive in recent years, and as a result has not suffered as 
adversely through E.E.C. membership and free-trade as might have been 
the case had these changes not taken place. The rising tide of 
unemployment has momentarily been checked. This in itself is an 
important achievement. In the present climate of a general world­
wide slow-down in growth, it may be that any expansion in manufacturing 
employment should be considered a success. Amongst other things the 
I.D.A. has finally put Ireland on the industrial map, and more recent 
performance has been the envy of many competitors. What is more 
important now, however, is whether it will be possible to improve on, 
or even to match past performance in a future which holds nothing if 
not uncertainty. Without the I.D.A., a very bleak industrial future 
could quite easily be envisaged.
CHAPTER 5
IMPACT OF E.E.C. MEMBERSHIP ON THE 
INDUSTRIALISATION PROGRAMME IN IRELAND
After a majority of five to one in favour of joining the 
E.E.C. was obtained in 1972/ Ireland became a full Common Market 
member in 1973. While it would be expected that substantial benefits 
would accrue directly to the agricultural sector, it should be noted 
that without exception a majority support for membership was obtained 
in all the urban areas of the country. Undoubtedly this reflected the 
opinion that the perceived indirect benefits to the country as a whole 
would by far outweigh any possible benefits in remaining a nation in 
isolation from the biggest single trading block in the world. An 
important factor for the agricultural industry, which applied equally 
well to the manufacturing sector, was seen to be the possibility of 
breaking away from the neo-colonial relationship with the U.K., which 
Dr. Garret Fitzgerald (1978, p.21) described as -
"..... the least remunerative market for foodstuffs
in any part of the world," 
and gaining instead, free access to a market of 260 million people.
Having access to such a large potential market has been an 
integral part of the overall package attracting industrial investment 
to Ireland since the early 1970's. There has been a notable upsurge 
in foreign investment since then, of particular significance being 
that from Japan - eight of the nine industrial investment projects 
from Japan by 1979, were established after E.E.C. membership had been 
confirmed. Although some closures of older established firms can be 
attributed directly to the impact of free trade, this was not as sig­
nificant as might have been expected, since the protective barriers 
had been substantially eliminated in the 1960's, through tariff reduct­
ions, and the operation of Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreements, and thus 
reducing the impact of complete free trade which accompanied Market 
membership. At any rate -
"The additional employment provided by new Japanese,
American and other foreign industries has (1978) 
almost offset the loss of manufacturing employment
1National referendum.
due to the simultaneous impact of free trade and of the 
world recession." (Fitzgerald, 1978, p.25).
In terms of overall monetary transfers, Ireland has to date 
been a substantial net beneficiary within the E.E.C., but perhaps of 
far greater importance to the future development of the country is 
not the additional direct financial benefits likely to be gained, but 
rather the possible consequences for the industrial programme being 
pursued of having to operate within the bounds of present European 
legislative red-tape. One of the most crucial areas of legislation, 
dealing with Competition Policy, particularly as it affects State 
aids to industry - on which the present industrial growth programme 
in Ireland is highly dependent - could hold the key to future economic 
prosperity of the country. At present,uncertainty surrounds the 
applicability of these Policy Rules to Ireland, but, as will be seen 
partly in response to complaints from competitors, this matter is now 
being clarified in Brussels. The implications of this form the main 
part of the following discussion.
5.1 The European Regional Development Fund1
The European Regional Development Fund (E.R.D.F.) is the 
cornerstone of the European Community's regional policy. The size of 
the Fund and the regulations concerning its disbursement would, 
however, seem to indicate a distinct lack of commitment to any efforts 
to tackling regional problems as defined in a European context. The 
"watering-can" technique ensures that no matter how severe the regional 
problems of a Member State are as measured against those of other 
Member States, there is unlikely to be a major transfer of resources 
within the Community to aid these more depressed regions. This topic 
is unfortunately very large and beyond the scope of the present dis­
cussion, which focuses simply on the importance or otherwise of the 
Fund to Ireland.
During its first three years (1975-'77), the total Fund 
amounted to 1300 million u.a. (units of account). Ireland's share 
was 6% of the total, plus an additional 6 million u.a. to come from
JFor more detailed background information regarding the setting up of 
the Fund read Talbot, R.B. 'The European Community's Regional Fund' 
in Progress in Planning. Vol. 8, Pt. 3, 1977.
the allocations to all the other Members with the exception of Italy, 
making a total of 84 million u.a. (£35m). Assistance could be given 
from the Fund for infrastructural development and to industrial or 
service activities, providing that (a) the projects qualified for 
regional aid assistance from the Member State, and (b) investment 
exceeded 50,000 u.a. (approx. £20,000) and created or maintained at 
least ten jobs. The low level of development of Ireland in relation 
to the rest of the E.E.C. resulted in it being designated as a single 
region, eligible for the maximum level of assistance throughout. 
Nevertheless, the volume of Fund aid which has come to the country is 
mere 'icing on the cake1 when contrasted with national expenditure as
a whole. The 45.6 million u.a. received from the Fund in the first
three year period compares with 725 million u.a. in grants paid out 
to aid industrial development, and 1,210 million u.a. on public infra­
structure.
An indication as to how the Fund has been used in Ireland to
date is given by Table 27. All projects with an investment of less
TABLE 27. European Regional Development Fund: Commitments and
Project Approvals, Ireland 1975-79
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Projects -
Industry 52 17 15 27 22
Industrially Related Infrastructure 43 54 42 75) 20
Disadvantaged Areas Infrastructure 10 18 16 19/
Total 105 901 73 121 42
% Projects in D.A.'s (approx.) 71.0 46.0 62.0 60.0 53.0
Grant Approved (£M) 8.3 14.4 12.6 23.6 -
Actual Receipts (£M) 1.8 8.5 8.5 11.1 -
1includes Cross-Border Study.
Source: Mr. J. Colley, Minister of Finance, Dail Debate, 29/6/1978,
and Dept, of Finance, Dublin, (1979 figures unpublished).
than 10 million u.a. are included in a global application for aid, 
therefore it is not possible to give a breakdown of investment in 
each individual project. However, the accepted policy in Ireland - 
which differs from national development policy giving priority to 
industrial investment - is that approximately 70% of the E.R.D.F. 
receipts should go to infrastructural projects. It would appear also 
that a strong bias is being exerted in favour of the Development Areas, 
containing about 30% of the population, indicating that the government 
is in effect operating a policy of areal discrimination, and therefore, 
unlike the European Commission (E.C.), making sure that the Fund is 
assisting the greatest problem regions.
Praise for the R.D.F. must, however, be muted. At £29.9 
million, the amount of aid received by Ireland in 1975-'77 was only 
50% of that actually approved (£58.9 million). A cursory glance at 
the list of projects approved would also seem to suggest that Ireland 
is simply using the Fund to 'top-up' existing aid, rather than to 
initiate new projects, as is the intention behind it. There seems, 
for example, to be no difference between industrial concerns assisted 
through the R.D.F. and by the I.D.A.. In fact, all those listed were 
already being aided by the I.D.A.. Similarly, amongst the list of 
infrastructural projects alledged to have benefitted from Fund assist­
ance, are a large number of advance factories being developed by the 
I.D.A.. Perhaps the best that can be said is that some of these pro­
jects have had an advanced start-date, for it is highly unlikely that 
they would not have come about had the Fund not been in existence.
This would seem to defeat the rationale for the Fund, since the implic­
ation is that there are no additional net benefits, in terms of indust­
rial development at least, being derived from it.
Part of the problem is an administrative one. At present 
every Government Department or Agency applies for R.D.F. grants through 
the Department of Finance, which then submits the claims to Brussels. 
The Department handles all the financial arrangements, and undertakes 
some vetting of the applications, but at no stage is it apparent that 
co-ordination exists between the various applicants when submitting 
their projects for approval. Further to this, one Exchequer official 
has argued that under existing arrangements it is not possible to co-
ordinate the use of the Fund with programmes geared to overall 
national development priorities.1
Because of the time lag (often 6 to 9 months) between applic­
ation to Brussels and receipt of Funds, the Exchequer usually pays 
out in advance, being reimbursed by the E.C. post-facto. This 
involves the Exchequer in effect in providing an interest free loan 
to the E.C., and, allowing for inflation, reduces the value of the 
money when received. The delay involved has also affected the type 
of projects being forwarded, reflected in the reduction in the number 
of industrial projects approved for grant since 1975. The initial 
gear of the Fund operation was one of hardship and recession for 
industry in general. Many of the firms which had been approved for 
grants revised their development plans as a result, and failed to use 
up their full quota of award, which was subsequently 'lost'. In fact 
the total Fund aid taken up by Ireland in 1975 was only 20% of that 
approved. In order to avoid a repetition of this, preference is 
being given to larger, and therefore, fewer investment projects, with 
a greater chance of being completed within the period of award. One 
consequence is that the geographic spread of investment, possible 
through aiding numerous small projects, is much reduced. In terms of 
industry this means that fewer firms in fewer locations are likely to 
benefit from the Fund, thus reducing its regional impact.
5.2 The European Investment Bank
Before the existence of the R.D.F. the main source of Community 
finance for regional development was the European Investment Bank 
(E.I.B.). Even today, in absolute terms the money involved is far 
greater than that of the R.D.F.. It should be stressed that the fin­
ance provided is in the form of a loan - at or near to the going rate - 
and not a grant. The total amount received by Ireland since Accession 
stands at £392 million, covering a wide variety of projects, but 
chiefly for public infrastructure, and State enterprises.3 The absence
1personal interview, November 1979.
2disclosed in personal interview at the Department of Finance, Dublin, 
November 1979.
3includes the Electricity Supply Board, Bord na Mona (peat develop­
ment) and others.
of claims from private investors has been a disappointing feature 
throughout the E.E.C.
TABLE 28. E.I.B. Loans to Ireland, 1973-79 (£m)
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 TOTAL
Loan (£m) 11.1 24.8 22.0 35.4 52.1 78.5 168.1 392.0
The reluctance of private investors to use the facilities of 
the Bank, is perhaps, explained by the exchange risk involved in any
transaction. Money is paid out in a 'basket of currencies', with any
loss through currency exchange (particularly significant with weaker 
currencies such as Ireland's) being borne by the borrower. In seven 
years, only one application direct to the E.I.B. has been made by a 
private firm from Ireland. This is an important problem, since it has 
been compounded by a lack of 'easy' access to traditional credit fac­
ilities, which has been one of the negative effects of joining the 
European Monetary System (E.M.S.). The restrictions this imposed, and 
in particular the problem of obtaining credit from the U.K. market 
(resulting from the U.K. remaining outside the E.M.S.) have made it 
increasingly difficult for small Irish firms to raise enough capital 
to establish and to expand.
One way of circumventing the currency problem has been for 
intermediaries such as the Agricultural and the Industrial Credit 
Companies1 to obtain global loans from the Bank. These are then passed 
on to a number of individual companies, but the exchange risk remains 
with the State, through the Credit Companies. Although a small pro­
portion of the total loans claimed for, the actual amount obtained in 
this way has risen from £5m in 1974 to £15m in 1979. In the overall 
programme of industrial development the E.I.B.'s significance is far 
greater than these global industrial loans suggest. A large proport­
ion of the finance borrowed has been used for infrastructure which is 
vital for future regional industrial growth. The largest single 
borrower in this respect has been the G.P.O., with £67.5m being claimed
2The A.C.C. and I.C.C. are both Semi-State bodies with responsibility 
for supplying investment finance.
for telephone improvements, followed closely by the Electricity 
Supply Board, with £65m.
In addition to the above a further £58m was obtained through 
the Ortoli Facility1, specifically for infrastructure projects. Thus, 
directly and indirectly, Ireland has benefitted quite considerably 
from the loan facilities of the E.E.C. -
"The activities of the Bank have been directed towards 
overall Irish development and the creation of more 
favourable conditions for expansion, thus indirectly 
contributing to the development of the less developed 
regions."
It is nevertheless felt that the facilities offered are being under­
used, particularly by private industry, which to date has received 
loans totalling just over £40m. While there is no doubt that the
E.I.B. has been an important contributory element in the recent drive 
towards national and regional economic development, if State agencies 
are prepared to underwrite loans to private firms, then the potential 
for development could be considerably enhanced. The breaking of 
parity with Sterling, and the subsequent credit squeeze should be 
important enough factors to ensure that this facility is stretched to 
the limit in the future as a source of ready finance for industry. 
Domestic firms in particular should be given every encouragement to 
use the Bank, and every protection at the same time from any adverse 
effects of exchange transactions.
A number of other sources of finance have been made available 
to industry through E.E.C. membership. These include the Guidance 
Section of FEOGA2, which provides capital for industrial development 
related to agriculture, and the Social Fund. This latter has made a 
notable contribution to attracting new industrial investment, by pro­
viding 50% of the costs of training and re-training workers to acquire 
the skills demanded by the new growth industries. In absolute terms 
it has been more significant than the R.D.F., contributing £53.2m to 
Ireland in 1973-'77, including £42.lm in 1975-'77 compared with £35.3m 
from the R.D.F. in the same three year period.
1see O.J.E.C. L298/9 - 25/10/78.
2The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund.
It has already been noted that the direct monetary benefits 
to industry from the E.C. have not been substantial compared with 
national expenditure, but the indirect benefits have been enormous. 
Membership of the Community has not, however, guaranteed a secure 
industrial future for the country. Indeed the future success of the 
country's industrial programme could be seriously jeopardised if its 
present favoured position within the Community is in any way altered. 
The most serious threat, as will be seen below, comes from the 
Directorate General for Competition Policy, which has yet to deliber­
ate fully on the findings of its investigations into the present 
system of State aids to industry in Ireland. The implications of 
Competition Policy Rules for the industrial programme is an area which 
has been inadequately researched to date, but one which only now many 
people are realising will be of major consequence in the drive for 
full-employment in the next few years.
5.3 European Canpetition Policy and State Aids to Industry:
Which Way Next?
Central to the European ideal is the achievement of total 
economic and monetary union, with all Member States operating as com­
plementary rather than competing parts of the whole. Much of the
E.E.C. legislation exhibits a pre-occupation with customs and trade 
equalisation, and the elimination of 'wasteful' competition. Parallel 
to this is a strict adherence to a laissez-faire doctrine, which 
states that the market is the overall ruler, and that any measures 
taken to alter this position are, therefore, contrary to the interests 
of the Community at large. With Ireland being so dependent on foreign 
industrial investment, attracted by an extremely lucrative incentive 
package, any legislation which seeks to curb the role of the State in 
promoting this investment could be extremely damaging. Yet this is 
precisely what"the E.C. is seeking to do. It is indeed ironic that 
the only area in which the policy of 'harmonisation' is being actively 
pursued is one which could have major adverse effects for the worst 
problem region within the Community.
The rules governing the use of State aids for industry are 
contained in Articles 92-94 of the Treaty of Rome. Article 92 
provides that -
"....  any aid granted by a Member S t a t e  which
distorts or threatens to distort competition by fav­
ouring certain enterprises or certain productions 
shall, to the extent to which it adversely affects 
trade between Member States, be deemed incompatible 
with the Common Market."
This view was reiterated in the First Report on Competition Policy1 
(para. 133) -
"State aid generally means a conflict of interests 
between the recipient agents and their competitors 
in other Member States."
Some flexibility has been built into operation of these rules, which
is important in the Irish case, but as will be seen, this has led to
considerable ambiguity of interpretation -
"....  aids intended to promote the economic devel­
opment of regions where the standard of living is
abnormally low, or where there exists serious under­
employment may2 be compatible with the Common Market, 
but the final decision rests with the Commission 
rather than the individual Member." (Art. 92.3(a)).
Prior to Accession, representations were made to the Commission 
concerning the need for economic and industrial development in Ireland, 
and the need to protect and strengthen the measures being taken in 
pursuance of this goal. In reply, a special Protocol (No. 30) was 
annexed to the Treaty of Accession, in which the Commission agreed to - 
"Take Note of the fact that the Irish Government has 
embarked upon the implementation of a policy of 
industrialisation and economic development designed 
to align the standards of living in Ireland with 
those of the other European nations and to eliminate 
under-employment while progressively evening out 
regional differences in levels of development;
Recognise it to be in their common interest that the 
objectives of this policy be so attained; ....
Contained in 'E.E.C. General Report, Volume 5, 1971', Brussels 1972.
2Emphasis is that of the author - it is not contained in the original 
text.
Recognise in particular that in the application of 
Articles 92 and 93 of the E.E.C. Treaty it will be 
necessary to take into account the objectives of
economic expansion and the raising of standards of
living of the population."1
Ireland's apparent exemption from having to adhere to the 
'letter of the law' regarding Competition Policy regulations has, 
however, yet to be tested. Therefore, the strength of the privileges 
suggested by the above is unknown. It is wise to note, however, that 
although Protocol No. 30 has significant political standing, in legal 
terms it is an irrelevance. As one member of the Commission's staff 
put it, the protocol may give a certain degree of 'political security', 
but to date it has never been the centre of serious discussion con­
cerning conflicts between Irish Government policy and E.E.C. Competit­
ion Rules.2 The claim by the I.D.A.3 that full approval for their
package of industrial incentives had been given by the E.C. is mis­
leading, and it is apparent that no protection in this respect is 
afforded by the Protocol. In fact, the Commission made it abundantly 
clear that this was not the case, stating that -
"All aids existing in Ireland at the time of Accession 
will be studied by the Commission in the normal frame­
work of the permanent examination of existing aids.
If this examination were to reveal that it would not 
be possible to retain any particular aid in its exist­
ing form, it will fall upon the Commission under the 
rules of the Treaty to establish appropriate time 
limits and transitional procedures." (Declaration on 
the Economic and Industrial Development of Ireland on 
behalf of the Community by Mr. A. Moro, Italian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, contained in Treaty of 
Accession, CMND, 4862-1, HMSO, 1972, p.120).
If the I.D.A. was not fully aware of the type of aids permiss­
ible under European regulations, which is hardly likely, the position
1Emphasis given by the author.
2Personal interview with officer of D.G.IV, European Commission, 
Brussels, February 1980.
3'Industrial Development in Ireland', I.D.A. Dublin, 1979, p.6.
was clarified in Commission Bulletin in 1978, which contained the 
following guidelines -
1. the aids to new investment will not be allowed to exceed a 
certain ceiling expressed either as a percentage of the value 
of the investment or in terms of E.U.A. (European units of 
account) per job created;
2. similar ceilings will henceforth be imposed on aid to the 
least favoured development regions;
3. the Commission confirms its objections as regards operating 
aids within the Common Market: existing aids of this type 
will be frozen until the Commission has taken formal decis­
ions, which it will do within three years at most;
4. new techniques for measuring the intensity of aid are to be 
introduced for certain types of aid. (Bull. E.C. 11, 1978, 
2.1.34.)
This then requires that industry aids be made transparent. Any opaque 
aids (whereby it is not possible to calculate the net benefit through 
aid as a proportion of total investment) are deemed to be incompatible 
with the Community's Competition Rules. This hangs a question mark 
over any aids given to industry by way of favourable tax treatment, 
including export tax, and other incentives the value of which is 
impossible to measure ex ante, and which it is felt fosters wasteful 
outbidding for investment between regions and between Member States.
Perhaps the most glaring example of how Ireland has flaunted 
the rules lies in the operation of a scheme for Export Profits Tax 
Relief (E.P.T.R.). Although tax concessions are available to industry 
in both Italy and Luxemburg they do not match the scale of those in 
Ireland, where 100% exemption from tax on profits gained through 
exports is available. E.P.T.R. not only contravened Competition Policy 
Rules, but also those of the Common Market's Commercial Policy, which 
states that -
"....  measures to aid exports to third countries shall
be progressively harmonised before the end of the trans­
itional period to the extent necessary to ensure that 
competition between enterprises within the Community 
shall not be distorted." (Art. 112 of the Treaty of Rome).
The E.C. has acknowledged that the Irish package of incentives (but 
particularly E.P.T.R.) went -
"....  further than those of any other country in
Europe in encouraging export industries and in
attracting private capital for this purpose."
(Schaffer, 1979, p.242).
By inference it can be assumed that the Commission feels that these 
incentives offer an unfair cost advantage to Irish exporters over 
those of the other Member States. The possibilities for transfer- 
price manipulation offered by E.P.T.R. could also have an important 
bearing on competitiveness as between different firms (Kennedy and 
Foley, 1978, p.117, and Walsh, 1979, p.18).
It is not surprising then that in 1978 the Commission - 
"....  confirmed to the Irish authorities its funda­
mental objection to export aid and its reservations
in principle on certain operating aids." (E.C. 8th 
Report on Competition Policy, 1979, para. 161).
The latter remarks referred in particular to the existence of an addit­
ional non-discretionary fiscal allowance of 20% over and above the 
national allowance of 100% of capital expenditure on plant and machin­
ery to be set against taxable profits of firms operating in the D.A.'s. 
This gave a maximum possible allowance of 120% of capital expenditure, 
which, as it exceeded the amount of aid necessary to cover the initial 
investment, was felt to constitute an operating aid.
Considerable anger was voiced in Ireland at these 'intrusions' 
by the Commission (see Stanton, 1979, p.116), but the Government 
announced in December 1978, without recourse to the Protocol, that it 
would agree to comply with the directives from Brussels. As the nec­
essary changes have yet to be legislated for in the Dail, at present
the system of incentives remains unaltered. It is not therefore poss­
ible to ascertain what effect these changes might have on the attract­
iveness of Ireland to future investors. It can only be surmised that 
the loss of the additional 20% incentive in the D.A.'s might reduce 
the range of influencing factors available to the I.D.A. regarding 
internal location decisions, to the detriment of the more deprived 
regions, but, with arguably a more lucrative incentive being introduced 
to replace E.P.T.R. it is less likely that the country as a whole will
suffer a reduction in investment. As from the 1st of January, 1981, 
E.P.T.R. is to be superceded by a Corporation Tax (C.T.) at a flat 
rate of 10%. The fact that this should, as a transparent aid, be 
acceptable to the E.C. makes a mockery of that Body's incentive 
appraisal procedures. The low C.T. which will apply across the board 
equally to profits gained through export and through domestic sales, 
replaces the existing tax rate of 45%. Surely as this will inevitably 
make possible higher profits and/or lower production costs, this will 
give an unfair advantage to firms operating in Ireland. Why then is 
this compatible with Common Market policy while E.P.T.R. is not?
Higher grants per job available in Northern Ireland and else­
where, which have still failed to attract investment away from the 
Republic, have been cited as conclusive evidence that the attraction 
to it lies in other than directly measurable incentives. It would be 
wrong, though, to argue that this simply refers to E.P.T.R.. Rather 
the entire incentive package must be considered, along with other 
important factors such as political stability. It has been calculated 
that with the exception of Italy, Ireland offers the highest effective 
percentage subsidy to industry in the E.E.C., which has been estimated 
to be 50% greater than that available in the U.K.. Yet at present the 
'whole package' is not considered by the Directorate General for 
Competition Policy when it assesses the legality of State aids to 
industry. The value of each incentive is considered in isolation and 
its compatibility with the E.E.C. is assessed accordingly.
The marked reduction in the volume of mobile investment to be 
tapped has inevitably focused attention on the influence of available 
incentives on the location decisions of investors. While an aid to 
location may not necessarily directly affect the competitiveness of a 
firm, it can, understandably, adversely affect the regional develop­
ment programme of the Community. Further, it can lead to exhorbitant 
outbidding between regions and States, with the only real benefic­
iaries being the recipient industrial concerns. The acknowledged 
success of Ireland, particularly in attracting electronics investment, 
has caused consternation amongst other Member States, notably the U.K., 
Belgium and the Netherlands, where the failure to attract mobile 
investment on the same scale as before, has had an adverse affect both 
on the volume and the duration of unemployment.
In Scotland the Scottish Development Agency has expressed 
considerable concern at the loss of potential investors to Ireland, 
to the extent that suggestions have been made to the effect that the 
I.D.A.'s tactics in attracting new industry could be the subject of 
a complaint to the European Commission.1 The allegations of unfair 
rule bending are, nevertheless unfounded, since the incentives being 
offered by the I.D.A. have been sanctioned by the E.C.. It is per­
haps more likely that rather than the I.D.A.'s tactics coming under 
scrutiny, closer investigation will be demanded of the Commission 
procedures which have made them 'legal'. The danger of the present 
system is that outbidding will be encouraged to an even greater 
degree than before. This is confirmed by the announcement in the 
recent U.K. Budget (26th March 1980) of the setting up of 'Free 
Enterprise Zones', which one government official described as -
"....  mini-Irish Republics within the U.K."2
offering very high levels of incentives, including complete exemption 
from development land tax and from rates, and 100% capital allowances 
for commercial and industrial buildings for tax purposes. If Ireland, 
the poorest region in the E.E.C., is not offered any protection by 
the existence of its special Protocol, what protection does the 
Commission intend to offer it from an incentives war, from which, due 
to its relatively low level of development, and lack of financial 
resources, it will inevitably be the loser?
Some aspects of the incentive package have already been 
eroded as a direct result of E.E.C. membership, but a number of 
indirect restraints on industrial growth have also been imposed. An 
example of this is evidenced by the performance of Shannon since 
becoming part of the Common Market. Set up as a Customs Free Zone in 
1947 it was one of the most successful arms of policy attracting 
foreign industry to Ireland throughout the I960's. Although added to 
the list of free-zones recognised by the E.C.3 (Annex 1, para. 26 of 
the Treaty of Accession) its attraction has been increasingly dimin­
ished since Accession. The incentives offered at Shannon are now
Jsee the 'Glasgow Herald', 5/4/79 - 'Mostek', and 8/3/80 - 'General 
Electric'.
2B.B.C. Radio interview, 27th March, 1980.
3The original list was acknowledged in a Council Directive of 4/3/1969, 
contained in O.J., L58/11, 8/3/69.
subject to the same degree of scrutiny as those for the rest of the 
country, which means that, for example, E.P.T.R. will have to be 
phased out there as elsewhere. It has effectively been deprived of 
its advantaged status within Ireland, which could have serious reper­
cussions for the industrial future of the Mid-West region in which it 
is situated. The decision that the I.D.A. should assume S.F.A.D.Co.'s 
industrial development role for the region is perhaps further proof of 
effective indirect pressure being applied by Brussels to erase the 
free zone anomoly.
For a similar fate to befall the operations of the I.D.A. 
would be unthinkable. Any attempt to further reduce the range of 
incentives available could be construed as a major reversal of the 
stated policy to aid the most disadvantaged regions. In spite of its 
recent industrial successes, by any measure of economic or social 
health, Ireland is still a deprived region in E.E.C. terms. Until 
this is changed, the implied privileges in Protocol No. 30 must be 
honoured. This will involve not only a continuation of the highest 
permissible levels of aid for the whole country, but also continued 
support from Brussels for any measure which the Irish Government feels 
it necessary to introduce to further its programme of national devel­
opment.
It is clear from the above that E.E.C. membership has been a 
major influence on industrial development in Ireland in recent years. 
The influence of Brussels could, perhaps be more profound in the 
future. With the emphasis in the Market on economic 'harmonisation' 
rather than wealth redistribution, Stanton (1979, p.115) argues that 
for Ireland's representatives in the European Commission -
"....  the task of fending off E.E.C. pressure to
trim industrial incentives is critical, certainly 
more important than the attempt to win extra 
financial transfers."
To date the actions of the E.C. have not seriously jeopardised 
Ireland's potential for industrial growth. Sources in Brussels1 have 
indicated that major changes in Ireland's status are unlikely to be 
imposed in the near future. Nevertheless, the feeling of many in 
Ireland, as expressed by the 'Irish Independent', is that -
1personal contact.
11 the E.E.C., if it seriously threatened the
incentives system, will have to be told that over 
and above our obligation to uphold the terms of the 
Treaty of Rome is our obligation to ourselves."1 
In spite of this view, it would be folly for anyone to consider a 
future for Ireland outwith the E.E.C.. The words of Garret Fitzgerald 
should be well heeded, when he suggests that the exercise of sovereign­
ity within the Community nearly always works to the disadvantage of the 
smaller Member States (1978, p.27).
1quoted by Stanton, 1979, p.115.
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Chapter 6. CONCLUSIONS.
Ireland has progressed quite rapidly from being an agrarian 
economic backwater in the 1920's, to being a fairly well developed 
urban industrial economy by the 1970's. In spite of apparent 
successes however, particularly in the fields of economic and 
industrial growth, which experienced quite remarkable growth in the 
last decade compared with that of many other 'developed' nations, 
the country still faces the future with some foreboding.
Has the bubble finally burst? There are some indications 
that this indeed might be the case. The recent Budget (23 Feb.
1980) seemed to be preparing the country for a period of austerity, 
in an attempt to halt the mounting financial crisis towards which the 
country appears to be heading. Economic development has not gone 
quite according to plan as outlined in the 1978-81 Programme for 
Development. The Exchequer borrowing requirement forecast as loj- 
per cent of G.N.P. by 1979, and 8 per cent by 1980, was running at a 
rate of 13*7$ at the time of the Budget, largely due to rising public 
sector expenditure, which increased by 50$ in 1979 alone.' Many of 
the benefits hoped for in joining the European Monetary System (E.M.S.) 
have not materialised. Although expected to lead to a reduction in the 
rate of inflation this has not been the case, with inflation heading for 
20$ in 1980.' The rapidly weakening Punt, although beneficial in terms 
of competitiveness of exports, is proving an increasing liability, due 
to its effect on import costs. The dependence of Ireland's exports on 
product/component imports, makes it particularly difficult to exercise 
a tight control over the trading balance. This problem is further 
added to by the increasing volume of consumer goods as a proportion of 
total imports, which suggests that much scope exists for import 
substitution, with benefits being felt both in terms of manufacturing 
employment and in a reduction in the balance of trade deficit.
On the positive side Ireland has quite substantially altered 
its employment structure away from the primary sector dominance which 
characterised it for so long. Perhaps the most important factor here 
has been the existence of the I.D.A., which has helped to generate new
'Interview with Michael O'Kennedy, Minister for Finance, Radio Eireann, 
27/2/80.
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manufacturing employment growth and to restructure and modernise the 
existing domestic enterprises. Important advantages are seen to be 
gained by having a ’one step1 organisation dealing with industrial 
development. Compared with the plethora of promotional bodies which 
face prospective investors in, for example, the U.K., the realisation 
that one body can handle all aspects of industrial enquiries, from the 
initial investigation stage, to production and beyond, as well as 
making available the necessary package of incentives has proved an 
important attraction to mobile investment in particular. It has 
been noted that claims for industrial grants can be processed much 
quicker in Ireland by the I.D.A. than in most other European countries 
about 3 weeks compared to a time lag of 2-4 months elsewhere. Owens
(1979 pp 27-28) argues that it is far more flexible and dynamic than
British regional development agencies, and points to the fact that in 
a survey of British firms established in Ireland -
"The I.D.A. was identified as a factor inducing location 
.... as often for its flexibility and level of co-operation
compared with its British regional equivalents as for its
grant and tax relief schemes."
A further advantage over many of its British counterparts is the fact 
that the I.D.A. has greater resources, both financial and in manpower 
terms than most. This gives it a greater research capability, 
particularly useful in identifying potential new investment.
The incentive package offered is also of major importance 
however. Indeed without it, an Irish location would be markedly less 
attractive than it at present appears to be. In this respect the 
possibility that the European Commission may impose tighter 
restrictions on the type of incentives deemed to be permissable is 
a cause for undoubted concern. It would appear that in the short 
term at least, Ireland’s special position within the E.E.C., due to 
its relatively underdeveloped state is not under threat, but the long­
term prospects are less certain. The present dispute by Britain over 
payments to and receipts from the Community perhaps highlights the 
failure of the E.E.C. to rise above the level of a trading-block, with 
no real commitment to a redistribution of wealth and opportunity among 
the Member States. This is further evidenced by the weak nature of
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the Community’s regional policy, which aims at giving every country 
its ’fair share’ of aid, without actually assessing the need for that 
aid in accordance with criteria arrived at on a Community, rather than 
a national basis.
Admittedly Ireland is recognised as a single region within the 
E.E.C. qualifying for the maximum allowable levels of assistance 
throughout. This has its disadvantages, since the instruments are 
not finely tuned to the specific needs created by Ireland, which 
Barrington has described as -
”a group of sub-regions with differing problems but 
with a common need for regional development." (1976 p.35l) 
O’Parrell (l978b., p.38) has suggested that -
"Irelandfe current regional development problems are 
less related to its peripheral location per se than 
to successive expenditure policies during the past 
twenty years, which have placed a heavy emphasis on 
direct productive investment and job creation, and 
less upon infrastructural investment •••• with the 
result that bottlenecks occur."
E.E.C. funds are being used to provide new infrastructure which will 
in some way help to overcome the bottlenecks in certain locations, but 
one of the main contributory factors to the problem, and one of the 
main reasons why they look likely to persist is the lack of any 
authority to statutory powers to initiate and co-ordinate regional 
development planning. Although it has been suggested that the present 
Regional Industrial Plans of the I.D.A. might be used as a framework 
for overall regional development, it is unrealistic to think that this 
Authority has the ability to co-ordinate development other than for 
industrial needs, and even less likely that it would put regional 
social development needs before those of overall employment creation. 
Under present operational circumstances it is felt that the I.D.A. can 
do little but perpetuate existing locational disadvantage, if not by 
region, then certainly with regard to some individual locations. It 
was recognised in the Authority's 1978 Plan (p.22) that deficiencies 
at these locations, such as in terms of water supply and effluent 
disposal capacity -
".... will inhibit the growth of industry to meet the 
targets set in regional industrial plans."
105
One advantage is having a body such as the I.D.A., is that 
it can identify the existence and location of such deficiencies on 
a national scale, but it does not have the power to alter the 
situation - merely to request improvement rather than ensure that it 
is done. This then is a serious weakness in the regional development
strategy. Until it is possible to co-ordinate the timing of
interrelated developments on the ground the tendency will simply be 
to further develop only those towns where spare infrastructural 
capacity exists at a given time, while those towns which are deficient 
will continue to be overlooked. It is quite useful to have an 
industrial development strategy articulated in detail at the micro- 
locational level, as is the case with the town cluster targets 
outlined in the I.D.A.'s Plans, but it is another matter to ensure 
that this development actually occurs. If as appears to be the case, 
the I.D.A. has managed to overcome locational disadvantage by region 
through varying the incentives offered, then it can only be assumed 
that it is the lack of adequate ancillary services and of sufficient 
infrastructure which continues to hinder industrial development outside 
of the main settlement centres. If there is to be a commitment to 
something more than simply producing satisfactory global regional 
statisticss, in other words to dispersal of development within regions 
as well as between them, then room must be given for initiatives to 
come from, and be acted upon by the regions themselves. Development 
plans eminating from and being imposed by central authorities/agencies 
cannot possibly be expected to be flexible enough to cater for all the 
differing needs of the individual regions.
Most of the major problems to be faced in Ireland in the near 
future will however stem from present demographic trends, with very 
rapid population increase both through high rate of natural increase 
and quite substantial immigration. The increasingly 'dependent' 
nature of the population, while putting a strain on social capital and 
also necessitating increased public expenditure, may also be storing up 
quite substantial employment problems. If the 1971 activity rate of 
37.6$ is assumed for 1979, then the labour force should have been in 
the order of 1.265 million people. The fact that it was nearer to 
1.15 million would seem to suggest a quite significant decrease in 
activity rate over the period. With a lower of the average age at
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marriage and greater natural increase, it can be assumed that a 
large part of the decrease in activity rate can be attributed to a 
rise in the proportion of the population in the younger age cohort.
As this group will be coming on to the labour market relatively soon, 
the projection of a per annum increase of 9,000 in the labour force 
(assuming zero migration) which is forecast in the 1978-81 Development 
Programme might be considered to underestimate the magnitude of the 
problem. The main issue then is whether it will be possible to 
sufficiently step-up present levels of job creation to meet demand. 
Taking a rather pessimistic, but perhaps nevertheless, a realistic 
view of the prospects of achieving the full employment target set 
for the early 1 9 8 0's, Ross and Walsh (1979 p.26) point out that - 
"If employment growth only follows the best past 
trends, rather than future targets, the only way 
the unemployment target could be reached would be 
by a very substantial rise in emigration."
To an extent this echoes the earlier views of Geary and Dempsey 
(1977 P*19) who suggested that -
"migration within the E.E.C. (rather than simply to 
the U.K.) cannot be ruled out as a possible solution 
to the rising rate of unemployment."
The unemployment problems of traditional reception areas, such as the 
U.K., and of the other E.E.C. Members would seem to rule this out as 
a solution, therefore the unemployment problems in Ireland must be 
tackled from within.
In spite of the high number of job approvals acknowledged by 
the I.D.A. in 1978, even they do not envisage more than 75$ of these 
jobs materialising within five years. With mobile investment also on 
the decrease new initiatives must be sought to promote employment 
growth. Menion has been given of the steps being taken by the I.D.A. 
to encourage growth from ’domestic' sources, but perhaps there has been 
too much emphasis on manufacturing as a source of employment, and not 
enough consideration given to alternatives. The consequences of 
moulding a regional development policy around one sector of employment 
are only too evident in the East Region, which has suffered unduly from 
the diversion of manufacturing investment to other Regions, resulting 
in high levels of industrial unemployment in Dublin in particular.
What consideration has been given to tertiatysector development?
107
A recent survey (Bannon et. al. 1977 p*97) pointed out that - 
"regional policy has to date had little concern with 
the location of service functions in general or of
administrative activities, tourism excepted."
Yet tertiary sector employment has continued to expand unabated, and 
has substantially contributed to the regional employment inbalance 
which exists at present. In 1971, 43$ of office employment in the 
U.K. was to be found in the South-East, but in the same year in 
Ireland 59$ was in the East region alone (Bannon et. al. 1977 p.42).
Until the publication of the 1978-81 National Development Programme 
there had been no commitment to dispersal of Civil Servants as an 
element of regional policy. The indication in the Programme that 
2,000 such jobs are to be moved out of Dublin to eight medium sized 
towns is indeed welcome, as it may serve to broaden the employment base 
of these regional centres, stemming the flow of white collar workers to 
the capital, and therefore enhancing regional employment opportunities. 
Some moves have already been announced, such as that of part of the 
Department of Defence to Galway,' but the decision not to move any 
real decision making away from Dublin is to be regretted, and once 
again indicates a lack of real commitment to any policy initiatives 
which might reduce central authority power.
If manufacturing growth is not to offer a similar employment 
lifeline in the future to that of the past, there is still an important 
role for the I.D.A., which could encourage to a greater extent industrial 
service employment growth, with, for example, more emphasis on 
programmes of research and development, which would not necessarily be
tied by location, although would perhaps be best suited to larger
settlements which might better satisfy the 'social' demands of white 
collar workers. Perhaps it is for this reason that O'Farrell (1978 
b.p.36), looking at the possibilities of tertiary employment dispersal 
from Dublin, suggested that the only effective way to implement such a 
policy would be to -
"increase the process of polarization elsewhere in the
economy, possibly in one or two counter-magnet cities."
"Irish Press1 23/11/79.
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Such a policy would not be in accord with the present penchant for 
dispersal development, but as increasing reliance is likely to be 
placed on tertiary sector expansion, both as a regional development 
measure, and for absolute employment growth, then a properly 
articulated settlement strategy, to accord with development potential 
will have to be arrived at fairly soon. Otherwise development will 
continue to be haphazard and less productive than possible, following 
the whims of incoming investors and of bodies such as the I.D.A. itself.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of Ireland's recent 
development history, which has attracted the attention of many observers 
outside the country, has been the role played by the I.D.A. It has 
proved particularly useful to have a body which is not simply 
responsible for attracting and promoting industrial growth at the 
national level, but also,by varying the level and type of assistance 
it gives to investors is also able to exercise considerable influence 
on the location of projects within the country, and thus, in the 
absence of alternative statutory mechanisms can actively promote a 
programme of regional as well as national development. It is suggested, 
however, that a body as powerful as the I.D.A., which can exert quite 
significant pressure on overall national development policies, and can 
override the local authority decision making process, has only evolved 
as a result of unique factors operating in Ireland, namely the urgent 
need for national development, and the acceptance of a very high level 
of central authority power to ensure that objectives are achieved in 
the national interest. It is less certain that in a country such as 
the U.K., with a more well developed hierarchy of power and a much 
greater level of autonomy at the regional and local authority level, 
a body such as the I.D.A. would be acceptable in the form that exists 
in Ireland. As with the New Town Development Corporations in Britain, 
the success of the Authority demonstrates what can be achieved with 
adequate resources and power, and more particularly, when there are no 
political strings attached in the exercise of that power. At the same 
time, however, it would not be a model easily adapted to countries 
which are more economically and politically developed than Ireland is 
today.
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What of the future then for Ireland and for the Regions?
Crotty (1979 P*234) presents a rather pessimistic outlook, arguing 
that -
"Social pressures are now building up in a manner 
that has not been experienced in Ireland since the 
1840's."
This vision of unrest is further supported by Walsh (1979 P*14) who 
suggests that, in the face of mounting unemployment, unless the 
traditional safety valve of emigration does not once more become 
available -
".... it could be that the locus of political 
instability will eventually shift from North 
to South."
Perhaps these statements do exaggerate the problem, but the mounting 
discord which has manifested itself in massive demonstrations against 
existing tax structures and against unemployment should not go 
unheeded. The economy today is, to say the least, in a bit of a 
mess, with public expenditure running way ahead of resources, high 
inflation and a widening trade deficit.
The future of the country, however, lies increasingly less in 
the hands of the Irish people, and more in the hands of forces operating 
outwith Ireland, particularly in the European Community. It is 
essential that the fullest support is provided from other Member 
States, both financial and otherwise, to improve the state of the 
economy, and national development as a whole. This will also entail 
continued recognition of Ireland as a special case with regard to the 
operation of particular Community rules which might tend to limit the 
ability of the government to achieve its development objectives. If 
this is done then the progress made particularly through the efforts 
of the I.D.A. over the last two decades might be continued. Two main 
factors threaten this. The first is the continued rise in oil prices, 
which, since Ireland to date has no reserves of her own, will 
increasingly influence investment decisions, and will be a substantial 
burden on the economy. The second lies in the future of the E.E.C. 
Should the Community expand to include Greece, Portugal and Spain, all 
countries with similar developmental problems to those of Ireland, 
then it might be envisaged that financial benefits which Ireland at 
present enjoys through membership might be markedly reduced. Perhaps 
the greatest threat will come from Spain whose location in relative to
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the rest of the Community is more favourable than Irelands, and with 
additional benefits through membership might prove a more attrative 
location for foreign mobile investment than in the past, to the 
detriment of Ireland.
A further prospect is that policies will have to seek the 
most productive return on public investment, with the result that 
social goals will increasingly have to give way to national economic 
objectives. Regional policy need not be abandoned completely, but 
the demand will grow for more integrated development planning, 
necessitating a properly articulated locational strategy for 
population and productive investment.
The optimism of the 60's and 70's is changing to an ominous 
pessimism, which will perhaps only be allayed by another ’miracle1.
(c.35,000 words)
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